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Abstract
Human agents draw a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable
efficiency - a s though these inferences are a reflex response of their cognitive apparatus. The
work presented in this paper is a step toward a computational account of this remarkable reasoning
ability. We describe how a connectionist system made up of simple and slow neuron-like elements
can encode millions of facts and rules involving n-ary pre+cates and variables, and yet perform
a variety of inferences within hundreds of milliseconds. We observe that an efficient reasoning
system must represent and propagate, dynamically, a large number of variable bindings. The
proposed system does so by propagating rhythmic patterns of activity wherein dynamic bindings
are represented as the in-phase, i.e., synchronous, firing of appropriate nodes. The mechanisms
for representing and propagating dynamic bindings are biologically plausible. Neurophysiological
evidence suggests that similar mechanisms may in fact be used by the brain to represent and
process sensorimotor information.
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Introduction
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The ability to represent and compute with a large body of structured knowledge in an effective and systematic

of cc

way is a central characteristic of cognition. The richness and speed of human reasoning ability is illustrated

gene

by the following example derived from (Schubert 1989). Consider a person reading a variation of the Little
Red Riding Hood (LRRH) story in which the wolf intends to eat LRRH in the woods. The reader is at the
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point in the story where the wolf, who has followed LRRH into the woods, is about to attack her. The next
sentence reads: "The wolf heard some wood cutters nearby and so he decided to wait." It seems reasonable to
claim that the reader will understand this sentence spontaneously and without deliberate thought. However,

worl

a careful analysis of this sentence makes it apparent that even though the reader does not become aware of

it, understanding this sentence requires a fairly elaborate chain of reasoning. This reasoning may informally
be described as follows:
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To e i t LRRH the wolf will have to approach her (because to eat something you have to be near
it), if the wolf approaches LRRH she will scream (because a child is scared by an approaching
wild animal), if LRRH screams, the wood cutters will hear her (because a loud noise can be
heard a t a distance and screaming generates a loud noise), if the wood cutters hear the scream

and

they will know that a child is in danger (because a child's screaming suggests that the child is in

r

eacl

danger) the wood cutters will come to the location of the scream (because people want to protect
children in danger and in part, this involves determining the source of the danger), when the
wood cutters see the wolf they will try to prevent it from attacking LRRH (because people want

fact:
I

to protect children), and in doing so the wood cutters may hurt the wolf (preventing an animal
from attacking a child may involve physical force ...), so the wolf will decide to wait (the wolf
does not want to get hurt).
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Clearly, in addition to accessing meanings of lexical items, parsing, and resolving pronominal reference,
some computation equivalent t o the above chain of reasoning must be occurring spontaneously when we

(CS

process the sentence in question.' The above example illustrates that humans are extremely good at draw-
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ing a broad class of complex inferences with remarkable efficiency - within hundreds of milliseconds. Such
inferences are drawn effortlessly, spontaneously, and without any conscious intervention - as though they
are a reflex response of the agent's cognitive apparatus. Let us label such spontaneous reasoning as reflezive reasoning (Shastri 1990a). Any serious attempt at understanding intelligence must provide a detailed
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computational account of how such inferences may be drawn with the requisite efficiency.
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In evaluating the remarkable efficiency of reflexive reasoning it must be borne in mind that such reasoning
takes place with reference to an immense body of common sense knowledge. A detailed and eshaustive
compilation of such knowledge in terms of 'rules' and 'facts' will easily result in a knowledge base containing
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millions (perhaps even more) of rules and facts. At t,he same time, the speed of human performance suggests
that reflexive reasoning is computed in time that depends only on the length of the chain of inference and is
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independent of the szze of the knowledge base. This implies that the process of reflexive reasoning is highly
parallel at the knowledge level and involves pursuing a large number of potentially relevant inferential paths
in parallel.
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Complexity theory rules out the existence of a general purpose inference system that can derive all valid
inferences in time proportional to the length of the chain derivation - such a system would be t o the theory
of computation what a perpetual motion machine is to thermodynamics. But then cognitive agents are not

'

general purpose reasoners. They can only perform a limited - though fairly broad - class of inferences with
extreme efficiency. This suggests that an appropriate research strategy would be to develop limited inference
sysiems - systems that can perform a limited but interesting class of inference with requisite efficiency. The
t

work reported in this paper is the result of pursuing such a research strategy.

1.1

A Connectionist Metaphor of Reasoning

With nearly 1012 computing elements and 1015 interconnections, the brain's capacity for encoding, communicating, and processing information is truly awesome. But if the brain is extremely powerful it is also
extremely limited: the relative simplicity of individual processors, and the restriction on the complexity
of individual messages also impose strong constraints on the nature of representations and processes that

operate on them. Connectionist models (Feldman & Ballard 1982; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986) intend
to emulate the information processing of the animal brain - albeit at an abstract computational level -

I
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and hence, reflect the same strengths and weaknesses.

The fine grained and massive parallelism supported by connectionism permits one to assign a node to
each unit of i n f o r m a t ~ o n This
. ~ has the following interesting consequence: Assume that besides enumerating
facts about the world, we also identify the important inferential dependencies between these facts and
encode these dependencies by explicit links between the appropriate nodes. Then we can view inference

I

as parallel spreading of activation in a connectionist network. This connectionist reasoning metaphor has

tremendous appeal because it suggests an extremely efficient way of performing inference. This metaphor
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can be attributed to McCullough and Pitts (1988) who recognized the ability of neural networks to encode

1

propositional logic and to Quillian and Fahlrnan (Quillian 1968; Fahlman 1979) who applied the (related)
spreading activation metaphor to the domain of conceptual knowledge. The connectionist semantic network
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(CSN) described in (Shastri 1988b) and the DICIFIL system for reasoning about adjective-noun combinations
reported in (Weber 1989) also follow such an approach and perform quite sophisticated inferences with
requisite efficiency. The expressive power of CSN and DICIFIL systems extends beyond propositional logic
but is still limited to unary predicates and binary predicates with only one quantified ~ a r i a b l e . ~
In order to perform general and flexible reasoning, however, a representation system must be expressive
enough to encode systematic and abstract knowledge about structured and composite entities, i.e., it must be
expressive enough to encode rules with n-ary predicates and variables. The ability of connectionist models
to do so, however, is often questioned. It is argued that as connectionist nodes have extremely limited
processing power and as they can only exchange scalar levels of activation, connectionist networks are only
capable of encoding associations and simple inferential dependencies between minimally structured objects,
but

not complex inferential dependencies between structured and composite objects.
Let us try and examine the alleged limitations of the connectionist model. Consider a connectionist

representation of the fact 'John gave Mary Bookl'. This fact constitutes a piece of structured knowledge: it
does not merely express an association between the constituents 'John', 'Mary', and 'Bookl' but rather, it

.

expresses a specific relation between these constituents wherein each constituent plays a distinct role. Thus
one cannot represent 'John gave Mary Bookl' by simply activating the representations of the constituents
'John', 'Mary', and 'Bookl'. In general, the connectionist encoding and the rules of spreading activation
should be chosen carefully if the representation of 'John gave Mary Bookl' is not to be confused with the
representation of 'Mary gave John Bookl' or 'Bookl gave John Mary'. For related reasons, unless one
is careful, the simultaneous representation of the facts 'John gave Mary Bookl' and 'Susan bought Car7'
may result in the representation of the ghost fact 'Susan gave John Car7'! These problems are essentially
problems of cross-talk.

A connectionist mechanism for representing structured objects without cross-talk is illustrated in Fig. 1
(cf. Shastri 198813). Each triangular binder node binds the appropriate filler to the appropriate argument
and the focal node give23 provides the requisite grouping between the set of bindings that constitute a fact.
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The binder nodes become active on receiving two inputs and thus serve to retrieve the correct filler given
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a fact and an argument (and vice-versa). Such an encoding using dedicated nodes and links is suitable for
representing stable long-term knowledge; the required focal and binder nodes may be recruited over time in

trans
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order to represent new - but stable - grouping of constituents. Such a scheme, however, is inadequate if

does

such groupings have to be created dynamically.
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As we discuss in Section 2, a connectionist reasoning system must not only be capable of representing
structured knowledge but it must also be capable of operating on such representations in a systematic manner
to dynamically generate representations of (new) structured objects. This amounts to solving a complex form

of th

of the cross-talk problem, namely, the variable binding problem (Feldman 1982; Smolensky 1987).
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Perhaps prompted by the above concerns McCarthy has observed that connectionist systems suffer from

the s

"the unary or even propositional fixation" and the representational power of most connectionist systems is
restricted to unary predicates applied to a fixed object (see McCarthy's commentary in (Smolensky 1988)).
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Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have also argued at length that the connectionist formulation is inadequate for

the E
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representing structured knowledge and cannot embody systematicity and compositionality.
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1.2

A preview

The research described in this paper addresses the question of effective reasoning and the representational
adequacy of connectionism. We discuss the variable binding problem and describe a solution to this problem
using very simple phase-sensitive binary threshold units. The solution involves maintaining and propagating
variable bindings using temporally synchronous - i.e., in-phase - firing of appropriate nodes. The resulting
system can maintain and propagate a large number of bindings simultaneously as long as the number of
distinct individuals participating in the bindings during any given episode of reasoning, remains bounded.

A psychologically as well as biologically plausible value of this bound is about seven or eight (see Sections

3.2 and 3.4).
Next we show that the solution to the variable binding problem leads to the formulation of a connectionist
system that can represent structured knowledge expressed in terms of facts and rules involving n-a y relations
and variables and perform a broad class of reasoning based on this knowledge with extreme efficiency. The
time taken by the proposed system to draw an inference is only proportional to the length of the chain of

seem

inference and is independent of the number of rules and facts encoded by the system. Thus we demonstrate
that a system made of slow and simple computing elements with switching times and periods of oscillations
in the msec. range can encode millions of facts and rules and yet perform inferences involving chains of
reasoning in the hundred rnsec. range. The system's ability to do so is a direct consequence of the fact that
the system can support the simultaneous application of a large number of rules. The proposed system also
makes efficient use of nodes and links - the number of nodes and links required to encode knowledge is only
proportional to the number of rules and facts encoded in the network's long-term memory.

The view of information processing implied by the proposed system is one where reasoning is the transient
but systematic propagation of a rhythmic pattern of activation, where each phase in the rhythmic pattern

corresponds to an object in the dynamic or short-term memory, where bindings are represented as the
in-phase or synchronous firing of appropriate nodes, where long-term facts are subnetworks that act as

temporal pattern matchers, and where rules are interconnection patterns that cause the propagation and
transformation of rhythmic patterns of activation.
As we shall see, the rule-governed reasoning system does not embody any ezpliczt inference mechanism. It
does not manipulate or rewrite symbols in accordance with logical rules such as modus-ponens and universal
instantiation. It is a simple physical device made up of simple nodes that just propagate binary activation
levels without the intervention of a central controller, but inferences are the spontaneous and natural outcome

of the system's behavior.
The binding mechanism and the resulting reasoning system is biologically plausible in that it strictly
adheres to the core features of the connectionist model (these features are discussed in Section 3.1). At
the same time, there exists neurophysiological evidence to suggest that the basic mechanisms used here for
representing and propagating dynamic bindings, namely, the propagation of rhythmic patterns of activity
and the synchronous activation of nodes, play a role in the representation and processing of infkrmation at
the sensorimotor level (Freeman 1981; Gray & Singer 1989; Churchland 1986). Of course we cannot, and
do not, claim that the brain encodes rules, facts, and dynamic bindings according to the scheme outlined
in this paper but we think that it is significant that mechanisms implicated in low-level sensorimotor tasks
seem sufficient to model high-level cognitive functions such as systematic reasoning.
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Reasoning and the dynamic binding problem

In the previous section we observed that it may be possible to view inference as parallel spreading of activation

in a connectionist network provided one could solve the problem of representing structured objects and
performing systematic operations on such representations. We also mentioned that this gives rise to the
variable binding problem. We examine this problem in greater detail below with the help of an example.4
Assume that our reasoning system encodes the following general knowledge about the world:
If an agent gives a recipient an object then the recipient comes to own that object.

1
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Owners can sell what they own.

In

Given the above general knowledge, a reasoning system should be capable of inferring 'Mary owns Bookl'
and 'Mary can sell Bookl' on being given the additional information that 'John gave Mary Bookl'. Let us

shoulc

express the system's general knowledge a s first-order rules:
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and let us express a fact such as 'John gave Mary Bookl' as the atomic formula
give(John, M a r y , Bookl).

the ou
event.
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Before proceeding, two comments may be in order. First, we are assuming that knowledge about the

predic

world can be captured by 'hard' logical rules. The assumption that rules are 'hard' rules is not critical to

of the
bindin
a n inf

our work at all. As we point out in Sections 6 and 8.4, the proposed mechanisms for encoding knowledge
and reasoning with it can be generalized t o 'soft' probabilistic/evidential rules. What is critical however, is
the assumption that a n agent's internal representation of the world embodies the regularities, dependencies,
and causal relationships in the world, and such knowledge is not only systematic but also abstract and

conjur
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instantiation-independent. Hence, the use of rules, variables, and quantification.
Second, the rules and facts used in this example and elsewhere in this paper are only meant to illustrate
the problem of dealing with systematic and abstract knowledge, and are not intended to be a detailed
characterization of common sense knowledge. For example, the rule relating giving and owning is a gross

which

oversimplification and does not capture the richness and complexity of the actual notions of giving and

the in

owning.
In the above rules and facts, predicates such as give, own and can-sell may be viewed as collec-
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tions of arguments (or roles). For example, the predicate give may be viewed as the collection of arguments (giver, recipient,give-object) while the predicate own may be viewed as the collection of arguments
(owner, own-object). A 'fact' is essentially an instance of a predicate and hence, may be viewed as a collection
of argument bindings. Thus, the fact give(John, M a r y , Bookl) which is a particular instance of the predicate give, may be viewed as the collection of argument bindings: (giver = John'recipient = Mary,giveobject = Bookl). Observe that instead of 'variables' and 'variable bindings' we will be referring to 'arguments' and 'argument bindings'.
If we view predicates as collections of arguments and facts as collections of argument bindings, it becomes apparent that a connectionist system that represents and reasons with structured knowledge must

3

be capable of representing argument bindings in a rapid and dynamic fashion. First, a representation and
reasoning system must interact with other (external) processes that communicate facts and pose queries to
it. Therefore such a system must be capable of establishing argument bindings dynamically to represent
such facts and queries. For example. our reasoning system should be capable of establishing the argument
bindings: (giver = J o h n , recipient = 'Llury, give-object = Bookl) when it is 'told' that .John gave Mary
Bookl'. Second, the inference process dynamically creates znferred facts, and the system must be capable of
representing argument bindings that constitute such inferred facts. For example, our reasoning system must
represent the bindings (owner = M a r y , own-object = Bookl) when the system infers own(Mary, Bookl).
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In addition t o representing argument bindings in a dynamic and rapid fashion, a reasoning system
should also be capable of creating new argument bindings by systematically propagating existing bindings in
accordance with the dependencies between predicate arguments mandated by the rules.

A rule may be viewed as specifying an antecedent predicate, a consequent predicate, and a correspondence
own(y, z)] may be
between the arguments of these predicates. Thus the rule Vx, y, z [(x, y, z)give(x, y, z)
viewed as specifying the following correspondence between the arguments of the pzedicates give and own:
The recipient of a give event maps to the owner of an own event, the give-object of a give event maps to
the own-object of an own event, while the giver of a give event does not play any role in the resulting own
event.
A step of inference or 'rule application' may therefore be viewed as taking an instance of the antecedent
predicate and creating -dynamically - an instanceof the consequent predicate, with the argument bindings
of the latter being determined by applying the argument correspondence specified in the rule t o the argument
bindings of tKe former. Such a dynamically created instance of the consequent predicate corresponds to
an inferred fact. For example, the application of the rule Vx, y, z [(x, y, z)give(x, y, z)
own(y, r ) ] in
conjunction with an instance of the antecedent predicate give, namely, give(John, M a r y , Bookl) creates
a new instance of the consequent predicate own with the bindings (owner = M a r y , own-object = Bookl)
which constitute the inferred fact own(Mary, Bookl).
The system should also be capable of chaining inference steps, i.e., using an inferred fact in conjunction
with other rules t o create other inferred facts and so on. For example, the system should be capable of using
the inferred fact own(Mary, Bookl) in conjunction with the rule Vx, y [own(x, y) 3 can-sell(x, y)] to create
the inferred fact can-selZ(Mary, Bookl).
The above discussion suggests that a connectionist system for representing and reasoning with structured
knowledge must embody:
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1. A mechanism for representing dynamic argument bindings.
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2. A mechanism for creating new bindings by propagating argument bindings in accordance with the
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argument correspondences specified in the rules.
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In the rest of the paper we will often refer to argument bindings simply as bindings and to argument
bindings that must be represented in a rapid and dynamic fashion as dynamic bindings.
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nodes to represent dynamic bindings, iii) using an object-centered representation of bindings rather than an
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1.

The proposed solution to the problem of representing and propagating dynamic bindings involves several
ideas that complement each other. These include i) representing an object during an episode of reasoning as a
phase or time-slice within an oscillatory pattern of activity, ii) using temporally coherent firing of appropriate

?lit
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Solving the dynamic binding problem

argument-centered one, iv) distinct representation of each predicate and its arguments, and v) representation
I

of rules via explicit representation of the inferential dependencies between predicates and the correspondence

between predicate arguments. Before describing the solution and elaborating on these ideas we would like

to emphasize the basic computational features of connectionism and reiterate the constraints imposed on
the solution by the task it is intended to serve, namely, reflexive reasoning. The constraints imposed by
the connectionist architecture and reflexive inference preclude a number of solutions to the dynamic binding
problem and provide criterion for evaluating alternate solutions.

3.1

Core computational features of connectionism

We enumerate below what we consider to be the core computational features of connectionism. This list is
not intended to be a definition of connectionism but rather an enumeration of those features that capture the
essence of the computational model underlying connectionism and lead to its biological plausibility (Feldman

& Ballard 1982; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986). In addition to being neurally motivated these features also
lead to an optimal use of massive parallelism (for a discussion see (Shastri 1990a; Shastri 1990b)).

3.31
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Processing elements (units) compute very simple functions of their inputs.

Units output only levels of activation, i.e., a unit's output is only a scalar quantity with limited
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precision. Thus unit outputs cannot encode information such as symbol names, pointers, or addresses.
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Units are extremely limited in their ability to hold state information.

neu

Synaptic modifications cannot occur within tens of millisecond^.^
There is no central controller that drives the network operation by instructing individual nodes to

,

crei

perform specific operations.

3.2
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Some aspects of the dynamic binding problem

Some important aspects of the dynamic binding problem are summarized below:
1. Reflexive reasoning takes place with reference to an immense body of knowledge and the reasoning

system must encode a large number, perhaps millions, of richly interconnected rules. At the same time,
the speed of reflexive reasoning suggests that such inferences are drawn in time that depends only on
the length of the chain of inference and is independent of the total number of rules in the system.
This implies that the reasoning process must be highly parallel and must pursue a large number of
inferential paths in parallel. The proposed mechanisms should therefore be capable of representing and
propagating a large number of dynamic bindings simultaneously.

2. It is reasonable to assume that most cognitive tasks that are performed with extreme efficiency such
as language understanding (e.g., dialog and story understanding) tend to involve only a small number
of distinct entities6 at a time. During normal discourse we have to deal with perhaps three or four
distinct entities at a time, but a reasonable estimate of the maximum number of distinct entities we
can deal with at a time is around seven (RiIiller 1956). Of course a large number - hundreds or perhaps
thousands - of automatic inferences involving these entities may get drawn giving rise to a comparable
number of bindings.

aPF
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3. During an episode of reasoning, dynamic bindings must be created to represent inferred facts. Almost
all these facts constitute intermediate results, and hence, dynamic bindings need only be represented
temporarily for the duration of the reasoning process.7
4. The firing of a rule creates a new set of bindings, therefore the time taken to represent and/or propagate

a set of bindings should be no more than the time it takes to apply a rule. We believe that human
agents can perform reflexive inferences - even when they involve a chain of rule applications - within
hundreds of milliseconds. This suggests that the time it takes for a rule to fire is of the order of tens
of milliseconds. Consequently, the binding process should be capable of creating new bindings within
tens of milliseconds.

3.3

Representing dynamic bindings

In this work we use the temporal structure of activation patterns t o represent dynamic bindings. The
use of the temporal dimension extends the basic connectionist framework in a very natural manner and
provides it with the requisite power for representing and reasoning with complex structured information.
The significance of temporally organized activity in neural nets has been recognized by several researchers
such as Hebb (1949), von der Malsburg (1986), and Abeles (1982). In Section 5.3 we relate these explicitly

neural models to the system proposed in this paper. The use of time to encode conceptual information also
appears in the work of Clossman (1988) and Fanty (1988). Like the proposed system, Clossman's broadcast
net also uses phase information to represent bindings. Clossman's system, however, cannot apply a rule and
create new bindings and therefore, cannot perform inference. The solution to the dynamic binding problem
presented here supports inference: in addition to representing bindings, it also propagates dynamic bindings
along chains of rule applications to-create new bindings (i.e., inferred facts).
Several other solutions to the binding problem have been suggested such as the use of dynamic connections (Feldman 1982), parallel constraint satisfaction (Touretzky & Hinton 1988), position specific encoding
ing
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(Barnden 1989), tensor product representations (Dolan & Dyer 1988), and signatures (Lange & Dyer 1989).
In Section 9 we discuss these alternatives and compare them with the temporal approach.
Let us refer to the schematic representation of some predicates and individual concepts shown in Fig.

2. A few comments about the figure before we proceed: i) Distinct predicates and their arguments are
represented using distinct nodes. ii) For convenience we will assume that each argument and predicate node
in Fig. 2 corresponds to an individual connectionist node. Later in Section 5.2 we show that each node
corresponds to an ensemble of nodes. This change does not alter the binding mechanism but makes it robust
with respect to noise and node malfunction. iii) Nodes such as John and M a r y correspond to focal nodes
of the complete connectionist representations of the individuals 'John' and 'Mary'. Information about the
attribute values (features) of 'John' and its membership in categories/concepts is encoded by linking the
focal node John to appropriate nodes, and t.his information can be accessed via the focal node. Details of
such an encoding may be found in (Shastri 1988b; Fanty 1988; and Weber 1989). As Feldman (1989) points
out, focal nodes may also be replaced by a small ensemble of nodes.
The proposed system represents dynamic bindings using synchronous - i.e., in-phase

-

firing

of appropriate nodes. In particular, the dynamic binding between a predicate argument and its
filler is represented by the synchronous (in-phase) firing of nodes that represent the a r p m e n t
and the filler.
With reference to the nodes in Fig. 2, the dynamic representation of the bindings (giver

= J o h n , recipient =

Mary,give-object = Bookl) (i.e., the fa@ give(John, M a r y , Bookl)) will be represented by rhythmic pattern of activity shown in Fig. 3. (At this point, the activity of the predicate nodes is not of significance

pla
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and is not specified. Also, argument names have been abbreviated in the figure.) Observe that all active
nodes are firing with the same frequency but each node is firing in a specific phase (or time-slice) within
the recurrent pattern. The binding between an argument and a filler is represented by the in-phase firing
of associated nodes. The particular phase occupied by a filler and an argument is not critical. Thus the
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firing pattern shown in Fig. 4 also represents the dynamic bindings (giver = J o h n , recipient = M a r y , giveobject = Bookl) .
As another example, consider the firing pattern shown in Fig. 5. This pattern of activation represents

tot
for

the single dynamic argument binding (giver = John) and corresponds to the partially instantiated fact

OVE

give (John, x, y) ('John gave someone something').
Fig. 6 shows the firing pattern of nodes corresponding to the dynamic representation of the bindings
(giver = J o h n , recipient = Mary,give-object = Book1,owner = Mary,own-object = Book1,potentialseller = M a r y , can-sell-object = Bookl). These bindings encode the facts give(John, M a r y , Bookl),

am
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own(Mary, Bookl), and can-sell(Mary, Bookl). Observe that the (multiple) bindings between Mary and
the arguments recipient, owner, and potential-seller are represented by the corresponding argument nodes

I

firing in-phase with Mary. Similarly, the bindings between Bookl and the arguments give-object, ownobject, and can-sell-object, are represented by the appropriate argument nodes firing in-phase with Book1.
But observe that the individual concepts M a r y , Bookl, and J o h n are firing out of phase and occupy distinct
phases in the rhythmic pattern of activity. This highlights an extremely significant aspect of the proposed
solution:
the transient or short-term representation of an entity is simply a phase within a rhythmic pattern of
activity!
the representation of dynamic bindings is not argument-centered but object-centered (or filler-centered).
the number of distinct phases required to represent a set of dynamic bindings only equals the number

I

of distinct entities participating in the bindings and does not in any way depend upon the total number
of bindings.
What is perhaps equally significant about the temporal representation of dynamic bindings is that it
requires rather simple computational mechanisms. N o central controller is required to instruct or control
individual nodes - in fact, the solution does not even require a global clock.

3.4

A realization using phase-sensitive nodes

The solution to the dynamic binding problem may be realized as follows:

'

When active, nodes representing arguments and individual concepts fire with a fixed frequency and
hence, a fked period of oscillation a."
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A biologically plausible value of a may be about 10 rnsecs. and as a pulse is analogous to a spike, a

I

plausible value of w may be 1 msec. We discuss the question of biological plausibility in greater detail in
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The pulse width w, ~ i t which
h
a node fires occupies a small fraction of the period of oscillation s.
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Section 5 but the following observations appear relevant at this point.
An ideal system built out of nodes with frequency and pulse-width values of 100 cps and 1 msec. respectively, would be capable of representing arbitrarily many dynamic bindings as long as the number of

ing

distinct individuals involved in these bindings does not exceed ten. Any physical system, however, would be
susceptible to noise and drift in the values of a and w and it is unlikely that all ten phases within a period s

the

can be occupied without introducing substantial overlap and cross-talk in the firing pattern. Restricting the
total number of individuals participating in dynamic bindings at any given time to about seven would allow
nts
act

for moderate variations in a and w , and still ensure that the phases in which distinct individuals fire do not
i

overlap (See Section 5.2). If this number increases beyond seven the system may exhibit some cross-talk
among bindings. As this number approaches or exceeds ten, the cross-talk will substantially degrade the
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system performance.
As observed earlier, cognitive tasks that are performed with extreme efficiency such as dialog or story
understanding tend to involve only a small number of individuals at a given time, and although a large
number of bindings may .be generated at any time, the number of distinct individuals participating in these
bindings remains small (about seven). It is also believed that if the number of distinct individuals that
must be kept in focus exceeds seven, our ability to maintain coherence degrades. Thus, the limitation of the
binding mechanism resulting from a biologically plausible choice of parameters appear to be psychologically
plausible.

Propagating bindings: Encoding rules and effecting rule application

3.5

Our solution to the problem of encoding rules and propagating bindings during rule application follows
naturally from the idea that distinct predicates and arguments have distinct representations (refer to Fig.

2). In Section 2 we described how a step of inference or rule application may be viewed as taking an
instance of the antecedent predicate and dynamically creating an instance of the consequent predicate, with
the argument bindings of the latter being determined by the argument bindings of the former and the
argument correspondence specified by the rule. Hence what is required for encoding a rule is a mechanism

for propagating argument bindings from the antecedent predicate to the consequent predicate in accordance
with the argument mapping specified in the rule. With reference to the predicates in Fig. 2 , encoding the
rules

.

Vx, y [own(x, y)

J can-sell(x,

should have the following effect:

Y)]

The inltial state of activation described by the rhythmic activation pattern shown in Fig. 3
should eventually lead to the rhythmic activation pattern shown in Fig. 6.

I
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The desirl:d behavior can be captured quite naturally. by connecting the arguments of the antecedent
and consequent predicates to reflect the correspondence between arguments embodied in the rules. Thus to
encode the rules given above, the arguments recipient and give-object of give should be connected to the
arguments owner and own-object of own, respectively. And the arguments owner and own-object of own
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should be connected to the arguments potential-seller and can-sell-object of can-sell, respectively. If we
also wish to encode the rule: Vx, y [buy(x, y) + own(x, y)] (i.e., if an agent buys an object then he comes to

tra:
wit

own that object), we can do so by connecting the arguments buyer and buy-object of buy to the arguments
owner and own-object of own, respectively. This encoding is illustrated in Fig. 7.
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As before we assume that nodes encoding arguments and individual concepts fire with a fixed period
of oscillation n and a fixed pulse width w . For the present, let us also assume that the switching times of
nodes equal ?r and signal propagation times along links are zero (the last assumption is not required and is
relaxed in Section 5.1). In view of the above node behavior it is easy to see that the initial state of activation
shown in Fig. 8 will lead to the state of activation shown in Fig. 9 after just one period of oscillation, and
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thereafter, to the state of activation shown in Fig. 10 after one more period of oscillation. No additional
machinery is required for this to happen as long as argument nodes respond to inputs in a phase-sensitive
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manner. For a typical value of s , namely, 10 msecs, the pattern shown in Fig. 10 will result within 20
msecs. after the system state is initialized to the pattern shown in Fig. 8. Furthermore, the time required
to propagate bindings is independent of the number of rules encoded in the system and the same response
time will result even if millions of rules are encoded in the system.
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Conceptually, the proposed encoding of rules amounts to creating a directed inferential dependency
graph: Each predicate argument is represented by a node in this graph and each rule is represented by
links from nodes denoting the arguments of the antecedent predicate to nodes denoting the arguments of
the corresponding consequent predicate. In terms of this conceptualization it should be easy to see that the
rule application process corresponds to a pamllel breadth-first traversal of a directed graph and the encoding
allows any number of rules to apply in parallel. It also follows that the time taken to generate a chain of
inference will be independent of the total number of rules and facts and will just be equal to 1 * n where 1
equals the length of the chain of inference and s equals the period of oscillation of the nodes used in the
connectionist realization. Later is Sections 7.7 and 7.9 we show that this observation generalizes to rules
with multiple predicates in the antecedent.

r

A distinct representation of each predicate and predicate argument together with an explicit encoding
of the inferential dependency between predicate arguments seems essential if the system is expected to
apply multiple rules in parallel and represent the large number of dynamic bindings that may result from
these rule applications. In particular. the need for knowledge-level parallelism rules out purely distributed
representations where predicates and arguments are represented as patterns over common ensemble of nodes
(Hinton 1981; Touretzky & Hinton 1988).

I

3.6

Representing and propagating dynamic bindings - a summary

Given the representation of dynamic bindings and the encoding of rules described in the preceding sections,
lent
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one may view i) reasoning as the transient but systematic propagation of a rhythmic pattern of activation,

ii) an object in the dynamic memory a s a phase in the above rhythmic activity, iii) bindings as the in-phase
firingof argument and filler nodes, and iv) rules as interconnection patterns that cause the propagation and
transformation of such rhythmic patterns of activation. During an episode of reasoning, all the arguments
filled by constants currently in focus become active in the same phase as the concept thereby creating
transient 'temporal frames' of knowledge grouped together by temporal synchrony. This can be contrasted
with 'static' frames in a frame-based language that group together - spatially - knowledge about property
values of concepts.
Inferences are the spontaneous and natural outcome of the system's behavior. The system does not
embody any explicit inference mechanism. It does not manipulate or rewrite symbols in accordance with
logical rules such as modus-ponens and universal instantiation. It is a simple physical device made up of
simple nodes that just propagate binary activation levels, but in doing so cannot but infer what follows from
a given state of affairs.
The representation of dynamic bindings as temporally synchronous patterns of activity allows a very
large number of bindings to be represented simultaneously. This number is only bounded by the total
number of arguments in the system. Similarly, the total number of dynamic facts that may be represented
simultaneously is only bounded by the total number of predicates in the system. The relevant 'unit' of time
here is n, i.e., about 10 msecs. Thus when we say 'simultaneous' we mean 'during a time interval 7'.
The mechanism for propagating dynamic bindings also allows a very large number of rules to fire (apply)
simultaneously, this number in only bounded by the total number of rules encoded in the system.
The representation of dynamic bindings does not require hard-wired connections between all possible
argument filler pairs. This is extremely desirable, if not essential. In Section 1 we stated that the number
of rules required to capture common sense knowledge may run into the millions. We also believe that the
number of concepts, and hence, the number of potential argument fillers is also in the hundred thousand
range.g Thus a binding scheme that depends on the existence of connections will require an unnecessarily
large number of connections.
Although synchronous activity is central to the representation and propagation of binding, the system does not require a global clock. The propagation of in-phase activity occurs automatically, once an
tnitial set of dynamic bindings is communicated to the system. For example, once the dynamic fact
give(John, Mary, B o o k l ) is communicated to the system by forcing the nodes John, M a r y , B o o k l , giver,
recipient, and give-object to fire as shown in Fig. 8, the system automatically propagates - without the
help of any other control/clock signals - the bindings corresponding to all the inferred facts and results in
the pattern of activation shown in Fig. 10.
To simplify the presentation, all examples discussed thus far involved rules with a single predicate in the
antecedent. This is not a limitation of the system and it can encode and reason with rules that have multiple
predicates in the antecedent. Sections 7.7 and 7.9 specify how such rules are encoded.
A limitation of the proposed mechanism is that the number of distinct individuals involved in simultaneous

dynamic bindings is bounded by the rt~tiox l w . As explained in Section 3.4, if ?r and w equal 10 and 1 msecs.,
respectively, the number of distinct hidividuals that may participate in simultaneous dynamic bindings is
bounded by 10. A more realistic estimate - taking noise and frequency drift into account -may

be around

7. We do not view this limitation as 2. weakness of the system because we believe that not only reflexive
reasoning but almost any form of common sense reasoning that does not make use of props is also subject
to a similar limitation.
Another limitation of the binding mechanism as described above is that the system cannot represent
two dynamic facts pertaining to the same predicate simultaneously. This limitation only applies to dynamic
facts. In Section 4 we describe how any number of long-term facts about the same predicate may be encoded
simultaneously. In Section 8.1 we outline a scheme that generalizes the use of temporal synchronization to
represent several dynamic facts about the same predicate simultaneously.

4

~ n c o d i nlong-term
~
facts: Memory as a temporal pattern
matcher

In addition to representing dynamic facts, a system for representing and reasoning with rules and facts must
also represent long-term facts, i.e., facts that are stored relatively permanently in its memory. But what
should be the nature of representation of long-term facts and what relation should it bear to the dynamic
representation of facts?
The encoding of a long-term fact should allow the detection of situations that correspond to, or follow
immediately from, the encoded fact. In other words, the encoding should allow the system to directly answer
all questions whose answers depend on the fact alone and do not require the application of any rules (i.e.,
general domain knowledge). For example, the encoding of the long-term fact give(John, Mary, Bookl)
should recognize situations such as: give(John, Mary, Bookl), give(John, M a r y , x) (i.e., John gave Mary
something), give(x, Mary, y), and give(x, y, 2) (i.e., Someone gave something to someone). However it should
not recognize situations such as: give(Mary, John, Bookl), give(John, Susan, x), or own(Mary, Bookl).
Notice that the last fact cannot be recognized directly from the given fact even though it can be inferred from
it via a rule application. Similarly, the encoding of the long-term fact: give(John, Mary, x) should recognize
situations such as give(John, Mary, x), give(x, Mary, y), and give(x, y, z), but not give(Mary, John, x), or
give(John, Mary, Bookl) (this last situation specifies Bookl as the give-object, something not supported
by the given fact).
In the context of the proposed system, a 'situation' essentially corresponds to the set of dynamic bindings
represented in the system's state of activation. Therefore the encoding of a long-term fact should be capable
of detecting whether the (static) bindings that constitute the fact, match the dynamic bindings represented
in the system's state of activation. Given that the system represents dynamic bindings as temporal patterns,
the representation of a long-term fact should behave like a temporal pattern matcher.
The design of such a temporal pattern matcher is illustrated in Figures 11 and 12. These figures encode
the long-term facts give(John, Mary, Bookl) and give(John, Mary, z), respectively. Although the complete
rationale for choosing this particular encoding will become apparent in Section 7 , the basic idea can be

conveyed at this point. The encoding of a long-term fact consists of a r-and node (see below) that receives
an input from the predicate associated with the fact. The input from the predicate is modified by inhibitory

!CS.,

:s is

links (Kandel 1976) from the arguments of the predicate. If the fact specifies a filler for an argument then the
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inhibitory link from the argument is in turn modified by an inhibitory link from the filler. The r-and node
is a temporal and node, i.e., it becomes active if and only if it receives unintempted input for a duration
equal to its period of oscillation. The output of the r-and node constitutes the output of the long-term fact

lent

and this node is expected to become active if and only if the long-term fact matches the dynamic bindings

mic

represented in the network's state of activation.
It can be shown that the suggested encoding of a long-term fact behaves in the desired manner: First,
assume that a predicate becomes active whenever any query or dynamic fact involving the predicate is

ded
1 to

represented in the system and generates a continuous output (how this happens will become apparent in
Section 7). Now if a predicate argument is active, it will block the output of the predicate going into the
r-and node, unless the filler of this argument is also active simultaneously. But an argument and filler are
active simultaneously if and only if they are bound. Therefore it follows that the T-and node will receive

uninterrupted input if and only if the dynamic bindings represented in the system's state of activation are

such that
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Either an argument is unbound, or if it is bound, the argument filler in the dynamic binding
matches the argument filler specified in the long-term fact.
The reader may wish to verify that the encodings given in Figures 11 and 12 will behave exactly as expected

a
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(see paragraph two of this section). The proposed encoding allows an arbitrary number of long-term facts
involving the same predicate t o be encoded in the system. It also allows any number of long-term facts, even
if they involve the same predicate, to become active simultaneously.
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Computational requirements and their biological plausibility
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of noise and show that the solutions suggested in the preceding sections generalize to a noise tolerant system
in which arguments are represented as ensembles of nodes rather than single nodes. We also comment on

the biological plausibility of the proposed solutions and relate them to some neural models of perception and
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In this section we examine the computational requirements for representing and propagating dynamic bindings, encoding rules and long-term facts, and realizing rule-governed behavior. We also consider the problem

cognition.

Computation requirements

I

5.1

I

The proposed representation and reasoning system can be realized using binary threshold units (BTUs) that

1

are also sensitive to the temporal properties of their inputs. The critical property of these nodes is that

1
1

.

in response to an oscillatory input these nodes respond with an oscillatory output and

the timing, i.e., the phase, of their output pulse is precisely governed by the timing or phase of their
input
In view of their temporal properties we refer t o these nodes as phase-sensitive nodes. Phase-sensitive
nodes may be differentiated based on the window of time over which they sample their inputs and the width
of their output pulse. These differences give rise to several different types of phase-sensitive nodes - three
of which are used in the proposed system and are discussed below:
p b t u nodes: These nodes can fire with a stable period of oscillation, a, and a pulse width w , where
w is only a fraction of a. Biologically motivated values of a and w being

10 msecs. and 1 msec.,

respectively.
r-or nodes: These nodes are like p b t u nodes except that their firing pulse width is comparable to the
period of oscillation a. For convenience we will assume that the pulse width of r-or nodes is equal to

n.
r-and nodes: These nodes are like r-or nodes in that their firing pulse width is comparable to n, but
unlike T-or nodes, a r-and node becomes active if and only if it receives v n i n t e m p t e d input over a
time interval equal to the period of oscillation s. Thus r-and nodes may be viewed as temporal and
nodes.
The temporal behavior of phase-sensitive nodes interacts with the thresholds of these nodes, and consequently, these nodes behave as temporal-spatial integrators. If we assume all link weights to be 1, the
activation conditions of the above nodes may be described as follows: A p b t u node - and similarly, a r-or
node - with a threshold of k becomes active if it receives k simultaneous inputs (i.e., h inputs in-phase).

A T-and node with a threshold of k becomes active if it receives k simultaneous inputs throughout the time
interval n. Unless stated otherwise, we will assume that all link weights and all thresholds equal l.1°
In all illustrations, a p b t u node will be depicted as a circle, a r-and node as a pointed pentagon, and
a T-or node as a triangle. Although plausible values of the period of oscillation (a) and the pulse width of
p-btu nodes ( w ) may be 10 msecs. and 1 msec., respectively, we have chosen a to be 6w when illustrating
patterns of activity. This is purely for making the depiction of such patterns easier.
In Section 3.5 we observed that we could obtain the desired in-phase firing of a chain of interconnected
argument nodes by assuming that all signal propagation delays equal zero and all switching times equal x
(by switching time we mean the time delay between the onset of input to a node and the onset of its output).
Propagation delays include both, the conduction times for action potentials as well as synaptic delays, and
although it may be reasonable to assume negligible conduction times, it would be unrealistic to assume zero
synaptic delays.'' Fortunately, it is not necessary to assume zero propagation delays

-

it suffices to assume

that all links introduce the same propagation delay. It is straight forward to show that

If the link delays equal A , then the desired in-phase firing of nodes can be obtained by assuming
that the switching time of nodes equals n - A .
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The use of the above modified switching time - adjusted for propagation delay - will ensure that interconnected argument nodes wiJ fire in-phase during the propagation of dynamic bindings.
In a physical system the propagation delays may vary from link to link. Let Xi - the delay along link

li - be expressed as A. f q where Xo is a base delay and e i is a small link-specific deviation from Xo.
The proposed solution will be effective as long as the ti's, are small compared t o w . Consider the following
example. Let ti's be limited t o within f5% of w and let ?r equal low. Assume that seven distinct individuals
are involved in the b i n d i n e being propagated. Fkom the above it follows that ?r will essentially consist of
seven distinct phases, each of width w , and hence, the phase separation will be about 0 . 4 ~ .Consequently,
each phase can drift about 0 . 2 ~before cross-talk becomes a significant problem. As each link introduces a
drift equal to f0.05w, upto four links can be traversed before the total drift approaches the critical value of

0 . 2 ~ Thus
.
even with fluctuations in propagation delays, the system can perform chains of reasoning of length
four without cross-talk. A similar analysis assuming five distinct individuals in the bindings shows that the
bindings can be propagated without cross-talk over chains of length ten. The above analyses assumed that
the drifts interfered in the worst possible manner, and typically, the system will support longer chains of
inference without crosstalk.

5.2

Use of node ensembles to deal with noise

A physical realization of the proposed system may have to deal with larger variations in propagation delays
than those discussed above. Furthermore it must also be robust with respect to malfunction of individual nodes (perhaps, cell death) and other sources of noise such as spontaneous firings and drifts in fir,ing
frequencies. We believe that this ~ r o b l e mcan be dealt with in the cIassic manner, namely, by using ensembles of nodes instead of single nodes. The proposed solution to the binding problem directly generalizes
to the case where individual argument and constant nodes are replaced by an ensemble of nodes. Fig.

13 illustrates such an ensemble based encoding of the predicates give, own, and can-sell, and the rules
Vx, y, ~ [ ~ i v e (y,zz, ) + own(y, z ) ] and Vx, ~ [ o w n ( zy), 3 can-sell(x, y)]. Notice that each argument is represented by an ensemble of nodes rather than a single node, and links between argument nodes have been
replaced by a bundle of links between appropriate argument ensembles.
This encoding does not alter the basic mechanism for propagating and representing bindings. The
dynamic binding between an argument and a filler is encoded by synchronous (in-phase) activation of the
appropriate filler and argument ensembles. Thus the dynamic fact give(John, M a r y , Bookl) is represented
by having nodes in the argument ensembles gzver, recip, and g-obj oscillating in phase with the nodes (or
ensembles) representing John, M a r y , and Bookl, respectively. Propagation of bindings is realized via links
between argument ensembles that cause nodes in interconnected ensembles to fire in synchrony. For example,
the the dynamic binding (recip = M a r y ) will propagate and lead to the argument ensembles recip, owner

and p s e l l e r firing in synchrony. Similarly, the binding (g-obj = Bookl) will propagate and lead to the
argument ensembles g-obj, o-obj and cs-obj firing in synchrony. The encoding of long-term facts also remains
unaffected except that individual links from argument nodes are now replaced by bundles of links from
argument ensembles.
Representing bindings using the phase of activation of an ensemble of nodes rather than individual nodes

should greatly increase the robustness of the system and reduce its sensitivity t o spontaneous firing and drift
in firing frequency of individual cells, cell death, as well as variations in the propagation delays of individual
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links (Abeles 1982; Crick 1984; Strong & Whitehead 1989).
prin

5.3

Biological plausibility

The computational properties of nodes stated above fall strictly within the constraints imposed by the core
features of connectionism listed in Section 3.1. If one accepts those features as a reasonable abstraction of
the computational characteristics of neurons, then clearly, the proposed representational mechanisms are
biologically plausible. But we believe that the mechanisms proposed here are biologically plausible in a
marginally stronger sense than what is implied by the above.
Before proceeding we would like to make it clear that we cannot - and do not wish to - claim that the
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brain encodes rules, facts, and dynamic bindings according to the scheme outlined in this paper. However,
there is considerable evidence that suggests that i) the basic mechanisms required for sustaining synchronous
(in-phase) rhythmic patterns of activity exist in the brain, and ii) such patterns may in fact be used by the

1981
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animal brain to encode and process information.
The existence of rhythmic activity in the animal brain is well established. The fact that EEG recordings

sim

display rhythmic activity - even though they measure gross electrical activity summed over millions of
neurons - strongly suggests that there exists significant temporal synchronization in neuronal activity (Sejnowsky 1981). More specific synchronous rhythmic activity has also been documented in the hippocampus,
cerebellum, olfactory bulb, and the visual cortex (Freeman 1981; MacVicar & Dudek 1980; Gray & Singer
1989).
Freeman (1981) has put forth detailed arguments based on analysis, modeling, as well as experimental
data t o the effect that the phase of neuronal response plays a key role in the representation of information
in the olfactory bulb. Churchland (1986) observes that the synchronization of rhythmic patterns in bands of
Purkinge cells in the cerebellum may embody "a fundamental principle of neuronal organization underlying
sensorimotor coordination".
Correlations between firing patterns of neurons in the visual cortex have been reported by several researchers. Gerstein (1970) and Toyama et al. (1981) have analyzed the cross-correlation in the firing of
two simultaneously recorded cells in the visual cortex of the cat. These studies provide examples of closely
correlated and even synchronous activity in pairs of cells in response to a moving light stimulus. For example,
Fig. 6 (p. 656, (Gerstein 1970)) provides a striking example of phase relationship between the firing of a
pair of neurons. The figure shows a cross-interval histogram of firings from two neurons.12 Such histograms
are particularly useful for detecting temporal relationships at time scales comparable to interspike intervals.
In this particular case, the histogram reveals an extremely clear phase relationship between the spike trains
produced by the two neurons. Gray and Singer have also studied the response of cells in orientation columns
of the cat visual cortex (Gray & Singer 1989). They report that a moving light bar of optimal orientation,
velocity, and direction of movement produces an oscillatory response that is tightly correlated with the phase
(and amplitude) of an oscillatory local field potential. They conclude that synchronous oscillation of an ensemble of coactive neurons is an integral part of the neuronal response in the visual cortex and suggest that
17
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the phase of the oscillatory response may be used as an additional dimension for encoding information in
the cortex.
The experimental finding reported by Gray and Singer is particularly significant. It is a well known
principle of perceptual organization and grouping that adjacent points moving with the same orientation are
perceived as belonging to the same object. One may therefore conjecture that the synchronous oscillation
of orientation specific cells responding to a moving light bar is the brain's way of encoding that all the cells
responding to this stimulus represent the same object. This is analogous to the situation in Fig. 10 wherein
the in-phase oscillation of the argument nodes recipient, o w n e r and potential-seller and the individual node

Mary is the system's way of encoding that all these roles are being filled by the same object Mary.
The use of temporally organized activity for encoding information has been a recurring theme in neural models of perception .and cognition. It appears in the form of 'reverberating cell-assemblies' of Hebb,
'topological networks' of von der Malsburg, and 'synfire chains' of Abeles (Hebb 1949; von der Malsburg
1986; Abeles 1-982). Recently, Strong and Whitehead (1989) have also proposed a mechanism for correcting
illusionary conjuncts during visual perception using the idea of temporal synchrony.
More than forty years ago, Hebb introduced the notion of reverberating cell-assemblies - groups of
simultaneously active cells - to explain perceptual integration at the feature level. In order to explain the
integration of several features into a distinctive whole, Hebb augmented the notion of reverberating cellassemblies and suggested that a complex object is represented by a 'phase sequence', i.e., by a sequence of
organized and repeated activation of the cell-assemblies that correspond to the features of the object. In the
words of Hebb, "Activity in a superordinate structure . . . is then best defined as beirig whatever determinate,
organized activity results from repeated activity in the earlier-developed or subordinate structures giving
rise to it.''
Abeles argues that synchrony is a necessary feature of neural activity and suggests that computation in
neural nets occurs via "synfire chains" - chains of synchronously firing groups of neurons. A synfire chain
is distinct from a cell-assembly in that the transmission of activity along cells in a synfire chain is assumed
to occur by the synchronous firing of cells. Abeles also argues that the existence of neural structures
required to support synfire chains is consistent with neuroanatomy and neurophysiology. One can clearly
identify synfire chains in our system when it propagates dynamic bindings during reasoning via the spread of
rhythmic patterns of activity. With reference to the ensemble-based encoding described in Section 5.2 (see
Fig. 13), the firing of rules and the propagation of bindings results in chains of argument ensembles firing
in synchrony.
Von der Malsburg shows that synapses that can alter their weights extremely fast - within hundreds of
milliseconds - can be used to create dynamic representations. A dynamic representation consists of several
groups of cells, with cells within a group firing in synchrony and cells across different groups firing out of
synchrony. As we have seen, our system also uses temporal synchrony and desynchrony among groups of cells
to represent dynamic bindings but it does not require any synaptic modifications in order to do so (again
refer to Section 5.2). This is fortunate because, as pointed out in Section 3.2, reflexive reasoning requires
that dynamic bindings be established and propagated within tens of milliseconds, and hence, there is not
enough time to realize such bindings via synaptic modifications unless one assumes the existence of even

faster synapses that can be modified within tens of milliseconds. The above is perhaps a moot issue because
our system does not even require connections between arguments and their fillers to create dynamic bindings.

perf;

The encoding of rules as long-term structures together with the use of temporal synchrony for representing
dynamic bindings obviates the need for any hard-wired connections between arguments and their fillers (refer
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to Fig. 7). (We only need hard-wired connections to encode long-term facts). In contrast, any scheme for
representing dynamic bindings that uses synaptic modification requires the existence of connections between

all possible argument filler pairs.
The system described in Section 3 can rapidly and automatically infer what follows from a dynamically
introduced fact. We have not said anything regarding the process or mechanism that might create dynamic
bindings to represent a newly introduced fact via say, a linguistic input. The answer to this question is well
beyond the scope of this paper but a mechanism similar to the 'searchlight' proposed by Crick (1984) may
play a role in realizing this function. The searchlight mechanism proposed by Crick provides rapid bursts
of activation selectively, to different groups of neurons. Thus one may envisage a multiple-beam searchlight
mechanism that provides a burst of synchronous activation to M a r y and buyer and simultaneously a phaseshifted burst of synchronous activation t o Porshel7 and buy-obj in response to the input 'Mary bought
Porshel7'. Like Crick's searchlight, this mechanism should provide such bursts only for a few hundred
milliseconds - long enough for the system to draw reflexive inferences but short enough to allow the system
to represent the next input.
In the system described in this paper, new information is represented as a a transient trace of activation
while long-term memory is encoded using 'hard-wired' interconnection between nodes. What remains to be
seen is how some of the transient traces are converted into, and recorded as, synaptically encoded long-term
structures. We do not offer any solution to this problem, but we would like to emphasize that the problem
of learning the representation of rules and long-term facts proposed in this paper is no more difficult than
the problem of learning any structured representation in connectionist networks. It might turn out that the
fast synapses proposed by von der Malsburg play a role in sustaining short to 'medium-term' memories that
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must last beyond hundreds of milliseconds. Long-term potentiation in the hippocampus may also provide
a 'medium-term' memory store that mediates and controls the selective transfer of transient information to
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long-term memory.
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Putting things together

The proposed mechanisms for representing and propagating dynamic binding and encoding rules and longterms facts provide the basic building blocks for a connectionist system that can represent and reason with
structured knowledge involving multi-place predicates and variables. These mechanisms are fairly general
and may be put together in different ways to realize different sorts of reasoning subsystems.
Our presentation in Section 3 centered around a forward reasoning system, i.e., a system that performed
predictive inferences. Once the state of the system was initialized to represent an input situation by setting
up appropriate dynamic bindings, the system automatically generated dynamic bindings that corresponded
to situations that followed from the input situation.

,

The proposed mechanisms may also be used to create a backward reasoning system, i.e., a system that
performs ex?lanatory inferences. The behavior of such a system would be as follows: If the state of the
system is initialized to represent a (input) situation by setting up appropriate dynamic bindings, the system
will automatically determine whether this situation follows from the facts and rules encoded in the system.

,

In other words, the input situation can be interpreted as a query and the system's behavior can be viewed
as an attempt to answer the query using the knowledge encoded in the system.
So far we have been assuming that the reasoning carried out by the proposed systems is deductive in
nature. This need not be the case. There is nothing inherent in the proposal that precludes the representation of probabilistic or evidential rules. This work proposes a connectionist model for representing and
propagating dynamic bindings using the temporal aspect of node activations. Thus the strength of activation
(the amplitude of the output pulse) and link weights may be used for encoding rule strengths and degree
of beliefs in particular bindings. Based on our earlier work (Shastri 1988a; Shastri 1988b)' where we used
weighted link@to encode evidential or probabilistic information, we believe that the proposed mechanism
can be extended t o encode evidential rules such as 'If an agent gives a book to a recipient then the recipient will probably read it'. When told that 'Tom gave Susan Book37', a forward reasoning system that
encodes such evidential rules will not only infer 'Susan owns Book37' but also that 'probably, Susan will
read Book37'. When told that 'Susan owns Bookl2' a backward reasoning system will generate explanations
such as 'Someone probably gave Susan BooklS', or 'Susan probably bought Bookl2'.
With the aid of some additional - but by no means trivial - control mechanisms it may be possible
to design a system that combines forward as well as backward reasoning and admits evidential rules. Such
a system will be capable of i) representing incoming information and making predictions based on this
information by using its long-term knowledge, and ii) generating explanations for, and testing the consistency
of, incoming information by referring to its long-term knowledge. We envision the design of a system that

'

I

I

will perform a range of deductive and abductive inferences, make predictions and generate explanations,
and do all this with remarkable efficiency. Such a system will interact with and complement several other
representational and reasoning subsystems such as a frame-based hierarchical representation of concepts
(i.e., a semantic network), PART-OF hierarchies, and procedural representations such as routines (Shastri

/

dL Feldman 1986) among others. The relevance of such a representation and reasoning system to the design
of real-time intelligent systems should be apparent.

1

Having outlined the range of possibilities that may be realized with the proposed mechanisms, we turn
to a specific reasoning system that has been designed using these mechanisms and analyzed in some depth.

I

:

7

A backward reasoning system

We now describe a backward reasoning system that can encode facts and rules involving multi-place predicates

I
/

and variables in its long-term memory and perform an interesting class of inferences with extreme efficiency.
The system may be described as follows: The system's long-term memory encodes any number of rules
and facts. A query is posed to the system by initializing its state of activation to represent the (dynamic)

I

argument bindings specified in the query. The system then automatically determines whether the query

Fact

follows from the facts and rules encoded in the long-term memory. The answers to queries are produced
in optimal time, i.e., in time that is only proportional to the length of the shortest derivation of the query

'

give

and is independent of the number of rules and facts encoded in the system. (In the context of the backward

gzve

reasoning system, unless stated otherwise, we will refer to a 'long-term fact' simply as a 'fact'.)

buy(
own

A functional specification

7.1

01727

In the notation of first order logic, rules have the form

tria

where arguments for Pi's are subsets of {x1,x2, ...xm), while the arguments of Q consist of any number of
arguments from among the xi's, any number of constants, and single occurrences of existentially quantified
arguments introduced in the consequent.
Facts are assumed to be partial or complete instantiations of predicates. In other words, facts may
be viewed as atomic formulae of the form P ( t l , t 2...tk) where ti's are either constants or - distinct -
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existentially quantified variables. Later in Section 8.3 we describe how the system may be extended so that
the ti's may refer to concepts in a IS-A hierarchy.
A query has the same form as a fact: it is a partially or fully instantiated predicate where the uninstantiated arguments are assumed to be existentially quantified. Observe that a query, all of whose arguments
are bound to constants, corresponds to the yes-no question: 'Does the query follow from the rules and facts
encoded in the long-term memory of the system?' A query with existentially quantified variables, however,
has several interpretations. For example, the query P ( a , x), where a is a constant and x is an existentially
quantified argument, may be viewed as the yes-no query: 'Does P ( a , z) follow from the rules and facts for
some value of x?' Alternately this query may be viewed as the wh-query: 'For what values of x does P(0,I)
follow from the rules and facts in the system's long-term memory?'
Some examples of rules and facts are given below. Table 1 lists some queries, their interpretation(s), and

i

their answer(s).

I

Rules:

I

I

*

Vx, Y,z [give(x, Y,2 )
own(y7 211
vx, y tbuy(x, y)
own(+, y)l
Vx, y [own(x, y) J can-sell(x, y)]

*

Vx [omnipresent(x)

=+Vy, t ~ r e s e n t ( xy,, t)]

; Anyone who is omnipresent is present everywhere at all times

Vx, y [born(x,y) J 3t present(x, y, t ) ]
; Everyone must have been present at his or her birthplace sometime.
Vx [triangle(x) 3 number-o f -sides(x, 3)]
; A triangle has three sides.

Vx, y [sibling(x,y) A born-together(x, y) 3 twins(x, y)]
; Two siblings born at the same time are twins.

7.:
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Facts:
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give(John, M a r y , Bookl);
give(x, Susan, Ba112);

John gave Mary Bookl.

buy(John,Car7);

John bought Car7.

own(Mary,B a l l l ) ;
omnipresent(x);

Mary owns Balll.
There exists someone who is omnipresent.

triangle(A3);

A3 is a triangle.

sibling(Susan, M a r y ) ;

Susan and Mary are siblings.

born-together(Susan, M a r y ) ;

Susan and Mary were born at the same time.

Someone gave Susan Ba112.

In describing the backward reasoner, we will begin by making several simplifying assumptions. We will

sd

assume that rules have a single predicate in the antecedent and that constants and existentially quantified
variables do n6t appear in the consequents of rules. The rules and queries must also satisfy constraints that

.
3Y

follow directly from the limitations of the mechanism for representing and propagating dynamic bindings.
Subsequent sections will provide these details.

-

7.2

Encoding rules and facts in the long-term memory

Fig. 14 depicts a network that encodes the following rules and facts:

give(John, Mary, Bookl)

I

Each constant in the domain is represented by a p b t u node. Constant nodes have been omitted from
Fig. 14 but the links from these nodes to other nodes have been identified.
An n-ary predicate is represented by a pair of r-and nodes and a cluster of n p b t u nodes. One of the
i-and nodes will be referred to as the enabler and the other as the collector. As we shall see, the enabler
of a predicate P will become active if the network is being queried about P (this query might have been

!

posed by an external process or may have been generated - internally - by the system in the process of

answering a query). Similarly, the collector of a predicate P will be active whenever the network asserts
something about P. As a matter of convention, enabler nodes will always point upwards while collector
I

,

nodes will always point downwards. Also the enabler and collector of a predicate P will be labeled e : P
and c : P, respectively. With reference to Fig. 14, the ternary predicate give is represented by the enabler

!

r :give,the collector c : give, and the three argument nodes: giver, reeip, and g-obi. (We have abbreviated

the arguments recipient and give-object to recip and g-obj, respectively. We will do so often when labeling
nodes in illustrations.)
A fact is encoded using a r-and node which receives an input from the enabler node of the associated
predicate. This input is modified by inhibitory links from argument nodes of the associated predicate. If
an argument is bound to a constant in the fact then the modifier input from such an argument node is in
turn modified by an inhibitory link from the appropriate constant node. The output of the T-and node is
connected to the collector of the associated predicate (refer to Fig. 14.)
Unless there is a potential for ambiguity, we will refer to a 'constant node representing the constant c',
simply as the 'node c' or just 'c'. Similarly, for arguments.

A rule is encoded by connecting the collector node of the antecedent predicate to the collector node of
the consequent predicate, the enabler node of the consequent predicate to the enabler node of the antecedent
predicate, and by connecting the argument nodes of the consequent predicate t o the argument nodes of the
antecedent predicate in accordance with the correspondence between these arguments specified in the rule
(refer to Fig. 7). Notice that the links are directed from the arguments of the consequent to the arguments
of the antecedent. The 'reverse' direction of links is due to the fact that the system performs backward
reasoning.

7.3

Inference process

The inference process is initiated by posing a query to the system by activating appropriate nodes. The
inference process may be thought of as consisting of two stages (these stages overlap during the actual rocessing.) The first stage corresponds to a parallel breadth-first exploration of the potentially huge inferential
dependency graph (see Section 3.5). During this stage, all the (long-term) facts that are relevant to the proof
of the query become active. In the second stage the actual proof is constructed: activation from the relevant
facts flows downwards along collector nodes to produce an answer to the query. A yes answer corresponds to
the activation of the collector node of the query predicate. The time taken by the system to produce a yes
answer equals 1* T , where a equals the period of oscillation and 1 equals the length of the shortest derivation
of the query. A no answer results if the collector node of the query predicate does not receive any activation
for more than 2 * d periods of oscillations, where d equals the diameter of the inferential dependency graph
associated with the rule-base.

7.4

Posing a query: specifying dynamic bindings

As described in Section 7.1 a query is a partially instantiated predicate of the form P ( t l , ...,t,), where tis
are either constants or existentially quantified variables. Therefore, posing a query to the system involves
specifying the query predicate and the argument bindings specified in the query.
Let us choose an arbitrary point in time - say, to - as our point of reference for initiating the query. We
assume that the system is in a quiescent state just prior to to. The query predicate is specified by activating
e : P, the enabler of the query predicate P, with a pulse train of width and periodicity p starting at time t o . ,

The argument bindings specified in the query are communicated to the network as follows:

tra
Th

a Let the argument bindings in the query involve

k distinct constants: cl, ...,c,. With each of these k

constants, associate a delay hi such that no two delays are within w of one another and the longest
delay is less than .n - w . Each of these delays may be viewed as a distinct phase within the period
to and

to + a, and therefore, by assigning the delays bi to appropriate constants, we have effectively

associated a distinct phase with each distinct constant introduced in the query. (For simplicity, we will
assume that the Si's are evenly spaced over the time interval a.)
a

The argument bindings of a constant cj are indicated to the system by providing an oscillatory pulse
train of pulse width w and periodicity a starting at to

+ 6i, t o ci

and all arguments to which ci is

bound. This is done for each constant ci (1 5 i 5 k) and amounts to representing argument bindings
by the in-phase or synchronous activation of the appropriate constant and argument nodes.

7.5

Propagation of dynamic bindings and activation of relevant facts

Once the query is posed, a parallel search for facts that are relevant to the proof of the query ensues. We illustrate this process kith the help of an example (refer to Fig. 14). Consider the query can-sell(Mary, Bookl).
This query is posed by providing inputs to the constants Mary and Bookl, the arguments pseller, cs-obj

and the enabler e : can-sell as shown in Fig. 15. Mary and pseller receive in-phase activation and so do
Bookl and cs-obj. As would be expected, the two constants Mary and Bookl receive activation in distinct
phases. Let us refer to the phase of activation of Mary and Bookl as phase-1 and phase-2 respectively. As
a result of these inputs, Mary and pseller will fire synchronously in phase-1 of every period of oscillation,
while Bookl and cs-obj will fire synchronously in phase-2 of every period of oscillation. The node e:can-sell
will also oscillate and generate a pulse train of periodicity and pulse width x .
The activations from the arguments pseller and cs-obj reach the arguments owner and o-obj of the
predicate own, and consequently, starting with the second period of oscillation, owner and o-obj become
active in phase-1 and phase-2, respectively. iFrom now on, the nodes Mary, owner, pseller are active in
phase-1, while the nodes Bookl, cs-obj, and o-obj are active in phase-2. At the same time, the activation
from e : can-sell activates e : own (Refer to Fig. 15). The system has essentially, created two new bindings
for the predicate own - Mary has been bound to the argument owner, and Bookl has been bound to the
argument own-object. These newly created bindings of the arguments of own can be thought of as encoding
the query own(Mary, Bookl) (i.e., 'Does Mary own Bookl?')!
The T-and node associated with the fact own(12.lary,Balll) does not match the query and remains
inactive. This may be verified by observing that during phase-2, the activation from e : own going into the
r-and node is blocked by the inhibitory activation from the argument node owner. (Notice that Balll is
not firing).
The activations from owner and o-obj reach the arguments recip and g-obj of give, and buyer and
b-obj of buy respectively. Thus beginning with the third period of oscillation, arguments recip and buyer
become active in phase- 1, while arguments g-obj and b-obj become active in phase-2. At this time, the active
constant and argument nodes in phase-1 are: Mary, pseller, owner, recip and buyer; and those active in
phase-2 are: Bookl, cs-obj, e o b j , g-obj, and b-obj. In essence, the system has created new bindings for the

predicates can-sell and buy that can be thought of as encoding two new queries: give(x, M a r y , Bookl) (i.e.,
'Did someone give Mary Bookl?'), and buy(Mary, Bookl) (i.e., 'Did Mary buy Bookl?').
The T-and node associated with the fact buy(John, Car7) does not become active because the activation
from e : buy is blocked by the inhibitory activations from the arguments buyer and b-obj. (Notice that
neither John nor C a r 7 are active). The T-and node associated with the fact give(John, M a r y , Bookl),
however, does become active as a result of the uninterrupted activation from e : give. It is easy to verify
that the inhibitory inputs from recip and g-obj are blocked by the in-phase inputs from M a r y and Bookl,
respectively. The activation from this T-and node causes c : give to become active and the output from
c : give in turn causes c : own to become active and transmit an output to c : can-sell. Consequently,
c : can-sell

- the collector of can-sell

- becomes

active, resulting in an affirmative answer to the query

can-sell(Mary, Bookl). The propagation of rhythmic oscillations resulting from the query are depicted in
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Fig. 15.
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7.6

Encoding rules with constants and repeated variables in the consequent

co;

kn

In describing the encoding of rules and facts in the previous section we had assumed that constants or
existentially quantified variables do not appear in the consequent. We show illustrates how such rules are
encoded by illustrating the encoding of the following rule (see Fig. 16)
Vxl,x2 [P(xl,x2) a Vy3z Q(xl,x2, y,z,a)]

..... R2

t

In

t

The node labeled g l is a T-or node and it projects inhibitory modifiers that can block the firing of the R2.
The node g l ensures that the rule participates in an inference only if the conditions implicit in the consequent
of the rule are met. The first condition concerns existentially quantified variables in the consequent of a
rule. Observe that if a variable that is existentially quantified in the consequent of a rule gets bound in the
reasoning process, the rule cannot be used to infer the consequent. The desired behavior is achieved by the
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link from the fourth argument of Q to g l and the inhibitory modifiers emanating from g l . The node g l will

th

become active and block the firing of the rule whenever the fourth argument of Q gets bound.
The second condition concerns the occurrence of constants in the consequent of a rule. If a constant
appears in the consequent of a rule then this rule cannot be used if the corresponding argument gets bound
to any other constant during the reasoning process. This constraint is encoded by a link from the fifth
argument of Q to g l that is in turn modified by an inhibitory modifier from a. If the fifth argument 0f.Q
gets bound to any constant other than a, g l will become active and block the firing of the rule.
In most cases, the argument corresponding to the universal quantifier in the consequent has no direct
bearing on the activation of the rule, and hence, need not be connected to anything. There is however,
one exception: if the same variable occurs in multiple argument positions in the consequent of a rule then
we need to ensure that this variable is either unbound or bound to the same constant. This constraint is
encoded by introducing a node that receives inputs from all the argument nodes that correspond to the
same variable. Consider the network fragment shown in Fig. 17 that depicts the encoding of the rule

Vx P ( x ) 3 VyQ(x, x , y, a). The node 92 is like a r-or node except that it becomes active if it receives inputs
in more than one phase within a period of oscillation. This behavior ensures that the firing of the associated
rule is inhibited unless all the appropriate arguments are bound to the same constant.

'

Encoding multiple antecedent rules

7.7
I

I
'

A rule with conjunctive predicates in the antecedent, i-e., a rule of the form PI(...) AP2(...) A...P,,,(...)
Q(...),
is encoded using an additioqal T-and node that has a threshold of m. The outputs of the collector nodes of
PI, ...,P, are connected to this node which in turn is connected to the collector of Q. This additional node
becomes active if and only if it receives inputs from the collector nodes of all the m antecedent predicates.

(

The interconnections between the argument nodes of the antecedent and consequent predicates remain
unchanged. Fig. 18 illustrates the encoding of the multiple antecedent rule Vx, yP(x, y) A Q(y, x)

+ R(x, y).

The T-and node labeled g3 has a threshold of 2.

Total node requirement

7.8
I

In addition to performing inference extremely efficiently, the rule-based reasoning system also makes efficient

1

use of nodes. To encode r rules and f long-term facts, the system only requires O(r+ f +pa+c) phase sensitive
binary threshold units. In the above expression, pa and c are the total number of-predicate arguments and

'

constants in the domain, respectively. Thus the total node requirement is only linear in the size of the
knowledge-base.

f

.

7.9

Constraints

In this section we specify some constraints that govern the behavior of the backward reasoning system.
Our aim was not to build a general purpose production system or PROLOG engine that would draw all
inferences in time proportional to the length of the derivation. Such a system cannot exist - an efficient
general purpose production system is to the theory of computation what a perpetual motion machine is to
'

thermodynamics. Our ultimate goal is to develop a computational account of how an agent may perform
certain inferences with extreme efficiency and the backward reasoning system described above is a step in
this direction.
The first constraint on the backward reasoning system is that only a limited number of argument bindings

i

1

may be specified in a query. A biologically, as well as psychologically, plausible estimate of this number
appears t o be about seven. This constraint is a direct consequence of the limitation that the number of
distinct individuals involved in simultaneous dynamic bindings is bounded by the relative widths of

A

and

W.

1

As stated in Section 3.6, a limitation of the dynamic binding mechanism is that it cannot represent more
than one dynamic fact about a predicate simultaneously. For example, the system cannot - simultaneously
- maintain

the dynamic facts: g i v e ( J o h n , M a r y , B o o k l ) and g i v e ( M a r y , T o m , Car7). The system behaves

conservatively when such a situation arises; if every derivation of a query requires that a predicate be
dynamically instantiated more than once, the system does not answer 'yes' (even though this query may
logzcally follow from the rules and facts encoded in the system).13 In Section 8.1 we show that this constraint

!

may be relaxed by using the rhythmic and synchronous firing of nodes to simultaneously represent several
dynamic facts pertaining to the same predicate.

1

The encoding of rules described in Section 3.5 enforces the correspondence between the argurnents in the

antecedent ahld the arguments in the consequent of the rule. We have also described how the encoding of
rules can be extended to enforce equality among arguments in the consequent of a rule (Section 7.6, last
paragraph). llowever, it is not always possible for a parallel backward reasoning system to enforce equality
Q(y) and the query
among arguments in the antecedent of a rule. Consider the rule Vx, yP(x,x, y)

+

Q(a). The processing of this query will result in the dynamic query P(?, ? , a ) - where the first and second
arguments are left completely unspecified. Consequently, the system cannot enforce the condition that a
long-term fact involving P should match the query Q(a) only if its first and second arguments are bound
to the same constant. Contrast this situation with one wherein the rule is: Vx, yP(x, x, y)

+ Q(x) and the

query is Q ( a ) . The dynamic query resulting from the processing of the query &(a) will be P(a, a, y). Notice
that now the condition that the first and second arguments of P should be the same is incorporated in the
dynamically generated query, and therefore, gets enforced automatically. The crucial feature of the second
situation is that x, the repeated variable in the antecedent of the rule, also appears in the consequent and
gets bound in the query. This explains the third and last constraint. We require that:
a variable occurring in multiple argument positions in the antecedent of a rule that participates in
the answering of a query, should also appear in the consequent of the rule and get bound during
the query answering process.14
It is important to realize that the above constraint is required only in a backward reasoning system and
not in a forward reasoning system. In a forward reasoning system, the rule Vx, y P ( x , x, y)

+ R(x, y) would

be encoded as shown in Fig. 19. The node g is a r-or node with a threshold of 2 and receives inputs from
the two argument nodes that should be bound to the same filler. It becomes active if it receives two inputs
in the same phase and enables the firing of the rule via intermediary p-btu and r-and nodes. This behavior
ensures that the rule fires only if the first and second arguments of P are bound to the same filler. For an
extended example of such a behavior see Fig. 20 that depicts the encoding of the multiple antecedent rule

*

vx, Y, z P ( x , Y)A Q(Y,z )
R ( z ,2).
The restrictions imposed on the backward reasoning system do seem to exclude certain kinds of inferential
behavior. For example, it seems to exclude rules that are required to express the transitivity of a relation.
To assert that a relation P is transitive we need to say: Vx, y, zP(x, y) A P ( y , z )

+ P(x, z ) - wherein the

variable y occurs twice in the antecedent but does not appear in the consequent. This appears to be a major
limitation because transitivity plays an important role in common sense reasoning - to wit, reasoning about
sub and super-categories, ancestors and descendents, part-of relationships, property inheritance, and some
cases of temporal reasoning. We fully agree that we are very good at dealing with transitivity of a small
number of very specific relations. But we also believe that in all such situations, the transitivity of the

relation is encoded explicitly. The organization of concepts in a IS-A hierarchy using IS-A links to capture
the transitivity of sub-class/super-class relationship is an excellent case in point. In an IS-A hierarchy, the
sub-class super-class relationship is explicitly represented using dedicated IS-A links that allow the system to
efficiently compute the transitive closure of these relations. The use of dedicated links reduces the problem
of applying the transitivity rule to a problem of link traversal - an operation that can be realized efficiently

using spreading activation. Notice that a system that must compute the transitive closure of a set of tuples
in the IS-A relation by applying the rule: Vx, y, z I S - A ( x , y) A IS-A(y, z ) =+ IS-A(e, z ) will not be efficient

'

i'

(Allen & Frisch 1982). The above observation also applies to part-of, and occurs-during hierarchies. There
is no evidence that as common sense reasoners - especially when operating in the automatic and reflexive
mode - we are proficient in dealing with the abstract notion of transitivity in arbitrary situations. In
Section 8.3 we show how the backward rule-based reasoner can be combined with a distinct representation

of concepts organized in an IS-A hierarchy t o result in an efficient reasoning system that makes use of the
transitivity of the subclass-superclass relationships.

8 Some extensions of the reasoning system
In this section we outline some extensions of the backward rule-based reasoner that are under investigation.

Representing multiple dynamic facts about the same predicate

8.1

The representation for dynamic bindings described in Section 3 cannot simultan.eously represent multiple
dynamic facts about the same predicate. It turns out that the notion of rhythmic and synchronous firing of
nodes can be extended t o represent several dynamic facts pertaining to the same predicate.
The extension relies on the assumption that during an episode of reflexive reasoning any given predicate
need only be instantiated a bounded number of times - a plausible value of this bound being around three to
five. Thus we have two constraints on the nature of dynamic bindings: i) no more than seven or so distinct
individuals may be involved in simultaneous dynamic bindings and ii) no more than three to five dynamic
instantiations of the same predicate may exist simultaneously. The second assumption also seems plausible
for the same reasons as the first one and anyone doubting this is requested to read the following text without
repetition:
Susan loves Tom, John loves Lisa, Tom loves Mary, and Clara loves Tom.
and answer questions about who loves whom!15
Fig. 21 depicts the encoding of the binary predicate love with arguments lover and lovee. The assumption

here is that a predicate may be instantiated at most three times. Observe that we have three banks of
predicate and argument nodes. In general, k banks are required if we want the system to be capable of
dynamically instantiating a predicate k times. (As before, each node in the encoding may be replaced by an
ensemble of nodes.)
Fig. 22 depicts the firing patterns of individual nodes when they represent the two dynamic facts
loue(John, Mary) and love(Mary, Tom), simultaneously. As before a distinct phase is associated with each
constant and therefore, the firing pulses of J o h n , M a r y , and Tom occupy distinct phases. Also as before,
dynamic bindings are represented by in-phase firing of appropriate argument and constant nodes. The first
bank of nodes represents love(John, M a r y ) , and therefore, the argument nodes loverl and loveel are firing

m phase with John and Alary, respectively. The second bank of nodes represents the fact love(,blary,Tom),
and therefore, the argument nodes lover2 and loveea are firing in synchrony with M a r y and Tom, respec-

tively.

The predicate nodes lovel and lo.9ez are involved in the representation of dynamic facts, and hence, are
active. Observe that the period of cscillation of predicate nodes is 31, i.e., three times that of argument
nodes, while the pulse width of predic,ste nodes equals 1.Thus a typical period of oscillation and pulse width
of predicate nodes may be 30 msecs. md 10 msecs. respectively. Also notice that lovel and love:! occupy a

fol
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distinct phase in this lower frequency oscillation. This separation in the phase of lovel and lovez is crucial in
achieving the separation among the bindings belonging t o two facts. This becomes quite clear if we examine
the firing patterns obtained by and-ing (i.e., gating) the output of the argument nodes in a bank with the
output of the predicate node in the associated bank. Fig. 23 depicts this firing pattern. Observe that now
there is no temporal overlap - and hence, no cross-talk - in the representation of the dynamic bindings
associated with the two facts. As before, the bindings between an argument and its filler are encoded using
temporal synchrony at the 1 msec, level. At the same time argument-filler bindings pertaining to the same

.

fact are grouped or bound together using temporal 'synchrony' at the 10 msec. level.
Notice that we need not postulate higher levels of temporal groupings: two levels suffice - one to bind
arguments with fillers and another to bind argument-fillers that belong to the same fact. What we have not
yet specified is how the correspondence between arguments of the antecedent and consequent predicates of
a rule is encoded. This requires a mechanism (interconnection pattern) that would channel the temporally
interleaved activation arriving along argument links into available banks of argument nodes - without
interfering with the activity of argument nodes that are already in use. We hope to report a solution to this
problem in the near future.

8.2

Answering wh-queries

As explained in Section 7.1, a query with unbound arguments can be interpreted either as a yes-no query
or a wh-query. Treating such a query as a yes-no question assumes that the unbound arguments in the
query as existentially quantified. To answer yes it must be determined that there exist some instantiations
of the unbound arguments. The system described in Section 7 does this. To answer a wh-query, however,
the system must determine the instantiations of unbound arguments for which the query is true. It turns
out that there is a rather simple way of extending the system to do this.
Consider the proof of the query can-sell(Mary, z) with respect to the network shown in Fig. 14. The
yes-no version of this query will be answered in the affirmative and in the process the two relevant facts
own(Mary, Balll) and give( John, Mary, Bookl) will become active. The answer to the wh-query 'What
can Mary sell?', can be obtained by simply identifying the constants that are bound to the arguments g-obj
and b-obj, respectively, of the two active facts. This is not a coincidence - notice that %he arguments
g-obj and b-obj are precisely the arguments that map to the unbound argument cs-obj of can-sell via the
rules encoded in the system. The system can easily extract this information by making use of the same
binding propagation mechanism it uses to map arguments bound in the query. A straightforward may of
doing so is to posit a separate answer extractton stage that is carried out after the yes-no query associated
with the wh-query has produced a yes answer. For example, given the query 'What can Mary sell?' the
system first computes the answer to the yes-no query 'Can Mary sell something?' and identifies the facts
own(Mary, Balll) and give(John, Mary, Aookl) that lead to a yes answer. The answer extraction stage

,

follows and picks out the constants Ball1 and Book1 as the answers.
The representation of a fact is augmented as shown in Fig. 24 in order t o support answer extraction.
The representation of a fact involving an n-ary predicate is modified to include n 1 additional nodes: for
each of the n arguments of the associated predicate there exists a two input p b t u node with a threshold of

+

a

two. For convenience we will refer to such a node as a binder node. The other node (shown as a filled-in
pointed pentagon) is like a T-and node except that once activated, it stays on for some time - say l o r , or
a few hundred milliseconds - even after the inputs are withdrawn. This node, which we will refer t o as the

,

I

-

latch node, receives & Answer input in addition to an input from the r-and node of the associated fact.
At the end of the first stage, the outputs of the T-and nodes of all the relevant facts would be active.
The output of these T-and nodes in conjunction with the Answer signal will turn on the associated latch
nodes and provide one of the two inputs to the binder nodes. If the associated yes-no-query results in a
yes answer, the answer extraction stage is initiated. Inputs relating to the first stage are withdrawn and
each unbound argument of the query predicate is activated in a distinct phase using a pulse train of width w
and periodicity r. In addition a network wide Answer signal is also propagated. The activation of unbound
query arguments results in a phase-sensitive propagation of activation and eventually leads to the activation
of arguments associated with facts relevant to the query. This provides an input to the appropriate binder
nodes of these facts. As the binder nodes were already receiving an input from a latch node, they become
active and produce a phase-sensitive output that in turn activates the associated constants in a phasesensitive manner. The answer to the wh-query - i.e., the constant(s) that fill an unbound argument ai of
a query - will be precisely those constants that are active in phase with a j . The tiine taken by the answer
extraction step is bounded by the depth of the inferential dependency graph.

8.3

Combining the rule-based reasoner with an IS-A hierarchy

There is a direct way of interfacing the rule-based reasoner described thus far with a connectionist representation of a conceptual hierarchy. (We will refer to the latter as an IS-A hierarchy.) This results in an
extended system that allows 'concepts' (or types) in an IS-A hierarchy to appear wherever constants could
appear in the basic system. Such an extended system may be realized by assuming that the focal node of
each concept (cf. Section 3.3) in the IS-A hierarchy is a p b t u node.
Each conceptual IS-A link is encoded using two connectionist links. Thus A IS-A B is encoded by a
bottom-up link from A t o B and a top-down link from B to A. The bottom-up links are enabled during
the processing of yes-no queries while the top-down links are enabled during the answer extraction stage of
1
I

a wh-query. The mechanism for selectively enabling bottom-up and top-down links is discussed in (Shastri

1988a). Fig. 25 illustrates the encoding of the rule and fact:

Vx,y [preys-on(x, y) 3 scared-of (Y,x)]

I

preys-on(Cat, Bird)

1

aod the IS-A relationships:

I.

1. is-a(Bird, Animal)

2. is-a(Cat, Animal)

3. is-a(Robin, Bird)
5. is-~(Tweety,Canary)
7. is-~(Sylvester,Cat)

4. i s - ~ ( C a n a r yBird)
,

6. is-~(Chirpy,Robin)

Table 2 lists some example queries and their answers based on the encoding given in Fig. 25. The time
course of activation for the query: scared-of (Tweety,Sylvester) (Is Tweety scared of Sylvester?) is given in
Fig. 26. The proposed encoding and the inferential behavior of the system is such that it interprets 'Cats
eat birds' to mean 'All cats eat all birds'. This is at best controversial and raises complex issues relating to
the treatment of quantification. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this paper.16
Interfacing the rule-based reasoner with an IS-A hierarchy further illustrates the interesting role played
by the temporal encoding of information during reasoning. It was observed in Section 3.6 that during an
episode of reasoning, all the arguments filled by a constant become active in the same phase thereby creating a
dynamic 'temporal frame' of knowledge grouped together by temporal synchrony. The notion of a 'temporal
frame' gets even richer when the rule-based reasoner is interfaced with an IS-A. hierarchy because in the
augmented system, the local as well as inherited property values of an entity, its type and supertype, as well
as the arguments it fills can all be brought together in a dynamic 'temporal frame' with extreme efficiency.
We are also investigating the possibility of interconnecting the rule-based reasoner with an IS-A hierarchy to encode rules with sorted (or typed) variables. The use of typed variables simplifies the form
of rules. For example, the following multiple antecedent rule, with repeated variables in the antecedent:
hurt(x) may be transformed into the single antecedent
Vx, y collide(x, y) A animate(x) A solidobj( y)
hurt(x), where x and y are variables of type animate and
rule: Vx : animate, y : solidobj collide(x, y)
solidobj, respectively. We hope to show that some of the type restrictions on the variables can be imposed
by appropriate inhibitory or excitatory links between concepts (i.e., types) in the IS-A hierarchy and the
rule-based component. These links will allow the rule to fire only if the relevant argument fillers belong to
the appropriate types (concepts).

8.4

Encoding defeasible rules

As mentioned earlier, there is nothing inherent in the proposed solution to the binding problem that precludes
the representation of probabilistic or defeasible rules. On the contrary, it is rather easy to extend the system
to incorporate such rules. The proposed system makes use of the phase of activation to encode binding
information. This leaves open the possibility of using the amplitude of activation and link weights to encode
the strength of probabilistic rules and the 'degree of belief' in the dynamic bindings. Based on our experience
with the encoding of evidential or probabilistic information we intend to extend the proposed mechanism to
encode probabilistic rules.''
When told that 'Tom gave Susan Book37', a forward reasoning system that incorporates probabilistic
rules will not only infer that 'Susan owns Book37' but also predzct that 'Susan will probably read Book37' by
making use of soft rules such as 'If an agent gives a book to a recipient then the recipient will probably read
it'. Similarly, when told that 'Susan owns B00kl2' a backward reasoning system will generate explanations
such as 'Probably, someone gave Susan BooklP', or 'Probably, Susan bought Bookl2'.

d

8.5

Admitting function terms

We are also looking at the possibility of extending the expressive and reasoning power of the rule-based
reasoner by allowing restricted occurrences of function-terms in rules and facts. The key idea is as follows:
Function-terms introduce new uninstantiated objects during the reasoning process. In our representation,
objects are represented as a phase in a rhythmic pattern of activation during an episode of reasoning.
Therefore, objects introduced by function-terms can be represented by allocating them an unused phase.

Thus during an episode of reasoning, the reference to mother-of (Tom) should result in the association of an
'unused' phase - say, one adjacent t o the one associated with Tom - for this uninstantiated entity 'mother
of Tom'. All arguments that are bound to 'mother of Tom' will oscillate in this phase. An easy of realizing
this would be to use a subnetwork that acts as a phase shifler. Clearly, the number of function-terms that
can be introduced will be limited to a small number. In this context it must be remembered that general
reasoning with function-terms is computationally intractable.

9

Some connectionist systems for encoding rules and dynamic
bindings

Reasoning systems that only have single variable rules can get by without actually solving the dynamic
binding problem. For example, if we only consider the structure of information encoded in the connectionist
semantic network (CSN) (Shastri 1988b), and ignore the evidential nature of information encoded in it,
we find that the 'rules' in the system are of the form: VzP(x) 3 Q(z) and VzP(z)
R ( x , a). Observe
that both these rules have just one variable and hence, during an episode of reasoning, only one constant
participates in all the variable bindings. Consequently, CSN does not require any explicit representation of
dynamic bindings.
Touretzky and Hinton's DCPS (Distributed Connectionist Production System) (1988) does represent
dynamic bindings explicitly, but its ability to maintain and propagate dynamic bindings is limited in critical
ways. First, DCPS can only deal with single variable rules. Second, it is serial at the knowledge level and
allows only one rule to fire during each processing cycle. Consequently, it does not satisfy the efficiency
requirements outlined in Sections 1 and 3.2. Finally, in spite of allowing only a single variable in a rule and
only dealing with a single rule firing at a time, the dynamic binding mechanism used by DCPS is susceptible
to cross-talk.

Let us consider systems that can represent rules with multiple variable. Lange and Dyer (1989) describe
the ROBIN system that uses signatures to solve the binding problem. They permanently allocate a distinct
signature to each constant and represent a dynamic binding by propagating the signature of the appropriate
constant to the argument to which it is bound.

Unfortunately, passing signatures amounts to passing

names/addresses and thus this solution violates the connect,ionist constraint that messages be simple scalars
(refer to Section 3.1). It also requires that nodes be capable of storing and matching long bit strings that
make up the signatures (alternately, the nodes must be capable of storing and comparing high-precision
analog values).

A significant improvement over the signature based solution can be arrived a t by noting that although the
total number of constants in any domain may be very large, the number of constants involved in a particular
reasoning episode is small (cf. Section 3.2). Hence, instead of permanently assigning a distinct signature
to every domain constant, it suffices to assign distinct signatures t o those constants that participate in an
episode of reasoning. Furthermore, this assignment can be temporary and need only exist during a reasoning
episode. What we have just said is that we do not need signatures, we can get by with markers (a la Fahlman

(1979)!
In fact, the solution to the binding problem based on temporal synchrony is functionally equivalent to
a solution based on passing markers. This can be recognized by observing that the phase associated with
a concept during the propagation of bindings may be viewed as a 'marker'. The in-phase or synchronous
activation of all arguments bound to a concept is functionally equivalent to marking these arguments with the
same marker. The temporal synchronization approach adopted by us, however, offers significant advantages
over the marker-passing approach:
While nodes in a system based on temporal synchrony need only communicate a simple ( O N I O F F )
level of activation, nodes in a marker passing system must selectively propagate and store distinct
markers. Thus nodes in the marker-passing system will be more complex - both in their memory
capacity as well as their processing power.
Compared to the marker passing approach, the temporal synchronization approach requires considerably simple machinery to support reasoning. In the latter, dynamic bindings are represented by
the synchronous activation of appropriate argument and constant nodes, and the detection of dynamic
bindings requires determining whether two signals are synchronized or not. In a marker-passing system
dynamic bindings will have to be realized by propagating the same marker to the appropriate nodes,
and therefore, the system will have to detect bindings. by determining whether two k-bit vectors are
equal or not (assuming that markers are encoded using k-bits). But detecting temporal synchrony is
easier than comparing bit strings, and hence, the 'mechanisms' required to detect and check bindings
in a marker-passing system will have to be considerably more complex. To make this concrete, compare the encoding of long-term facts shown in Figs. 11 and 12 with a 'device' that will be required to
perform the same function in a marker passing system. Observe that each inhibitory modifier in these
figures will have to be replaced by a k-bit comparator.
The use of temporal synchronization to create dynamic bindings is biologically plausible.
a

Another important difference will arise if we wish to encode defeasible rules. Our system uses the phase
of activation to encode binding information. Thus the amplitz~deof output pulses and link weights can
be used to encode the strengths of probabilistic rules and the 'degree of belief' in the dynamic bindings.

Another solution to the binding problem is based on frequency modulation (Tomabechi & Kitano 1989).
In this approach, dynamic bindings may be encoded by having the appropriate nodes fire with the same frequency. There are advantages to encoding bindings using phases rather than frequencies. In the phase-based
approach binding is represented by the simultaneity of activation and checking for simultaneous activations

1

I

i

is simpler and faster than checking that two signals have the same frequency. While the latter involves
sampling the signal over a time interval spanning several periods of oscillation, the former only requires
checking for simultaneity over one period of oscillation (cf. the design of a long-term fact in Section 4 ) .
Barnden (1989) discusses 'Conposit', a connectionist production system. Central to Conposit is a scratch
pad of registers called Configuration Matrices. A fairly complex interpreter reads the contents of these
registers and updates them. In Conposit, patterns are associated by virtue of the relative position of registers
that contain these patterns, as well as by virtue of the similarity between these patterns. The task of
propagating argument bindings is performed by the interpreter. The use of an 'interpreter' leads to something
I

akin the von Neumann bottleneck. Consequently, Conposit, like DCPS, only allows one rule to fire during
each processing cycle. Conposit appears inappropriate for modeling reflexive reasoning but we believe that
it is a plausible connectionist architecture for modeling reasoning that requires complex representations and
elaborate rule applications.
Feldman (Y982) addresses the problem of dynamically associating any element of a group of N entities
with any element of another group of N entities, i.e., a total of N2 bindings, -using an interconnection

I

,1

'

network. He shows how it is possible to achieve the association task with an interconnection network having
only 4
~ nodes
~ as1opposed
~
to the obvious one of N 2 nodes.

I

Smolensky (1987) describes a connectionist network that uses a tensor product representation of dynamic
bindings. The system encodes arguments (roles) and fillers as distributed patterns (vectors) over pools of
argument and filler nodes, respectively. The proposed network requires N 2 nodes to encode N2 bindings

I

without cross-talk. The network can however, store a greater number of bindings if some cross-talk among
bindings is acceptable.

/
1

Table 3 compares four connectionist rule-based reasoning systems along the following dimensions:

1. Nature of parallelism: How many rules can fire in a processing cycle, one or several.
2. Number of variables in a rule.

3. Reasoning speed: How long does it take to execute a processing cycle. In DCPS each rule application
involves several cycles of relaxation, and hence, is a slow process. There is also significant serialization
among the subprocesses underlying each reasoning step in Conposit. As ROBIN performs operations
over signatures, we expect it to be marginally slower than our system.

i
I

4. Complexity of messages: Are messages scalars or addresses/pointers.

1

I

5. Complexity of nodes:

1

6. Network size: With reference to the number of rules and facts encoded in the system

I

I

9.1

Using P a t t e r n containment for encoding dynamic bindings

An important aspect of the reasoning system proposed in this paper is the organization of rules into a directed

I

graph wherein the inferential dependencies between antecedent and consequent predicates together with the

(

correspondence between the arguments of these predicates are represented explicitly. This encoding in

conjunction with the temporal representation of dynamic bindings leads t o an extremely efficient reasoning
system. The proposed encoding of rules is signitcant in its own right. One may take this framework
for organizing rules and obtain other organizationally and functionally isomorphic connectionist systems
corresponding to alternate techniques for representins dynamic bindings. All such systems will share the same
effective mechanism for propagating bindings inherent in the explicit organization of rules and arguments.
These systems, however, will differ in the network size, reasoning speed, and biological plausibility. We
illustrate this by using the proposed encoding of rules in conjunction with an alternate representation of
dynamic bindings, namely, the pattern-containment approach (this approach was suggested by Geoff Hinton
in a personal communication).
In the pattern-containment approach. each argument is represented by an ensemble of nodes and a
pattern of activity is associated with each concept. A dynamic binding between a concept and an argument
is represented by inducing the pattern of activation associated with the concept in the argument ensemble.
With reference to the network in Fig. 27, the dynamic bindings corresponding to give(John, Mary, Bookl)
will be represented by the presence of the patterns corresponding to John, Mary and Bookl in the argument
ensembles giver, recipient, and give-object, respectively. Contrast this with the temporal encoding approach
where these bindings would be represented by having the nodes in the argument ensembles giver, recipient,
and give-object oscillate in phase with the nodes (or ensembles) representing John, M a r y , and Bookl,
respectively (refer to Section 5.2).
The propagation of bindings in the pattern-containment approach will occur exactly as it would in
the temporal encoding approach. Links between nodes in the argument ensembles of the antecedent and
consequent predicates will propagate the pattern of activity present along interconnected argument ensembles
resulting in the propagation of bindings.
It is instructive to compare the pattern containment approach with the temporal synchronization approach. The key question that must be asked is: 'What is the significance of the pattern of activity that is
associated with a concept and propagated across argument ensembles?' One possibility is that this pattern
encodes all the micro-features of the concept (Hinton, 1981; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). Such a
pattern, however, will be extremely large, and result in an inefficient use of computational resources: each
argument ensemble will have to be large enough to encode the entire pattern of micrefeatures associated
with concepts, and propagating bindings will involve propagating large patterns consisting mostly of irrelevant information. A more feasible alternative would be to assume that the patterns associated with concepts
are reduced descriptions. But then the temporal synchronization approach already makes use of reduced
descriptions - albeit of a very unusual sort. During the propagation of bindings, the phase associated with
a concept acts as a reduced description - a very reduced one at that - of the concept!
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Conclusion
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We have described a solution to the dynamic (variable) binding problem. The solution involves maintaining
and propagating variable bindings by propagating rhythmic patterns of activity wherein bindings are represented as the in-phase oscillations of appropriate nodes. We have also described how this solution may

be incorporated into a connectionist system that can represent long-term knowledge expressed in terms of
facts and rules involving n-ary relations and variables and perform a limited class of reasoning based on this
knowledge with extreme efficiency. The time taken by the proposed system to draw an inference is only proportional t o the length of the chain of inference and is independent of the number of rules and facts encoded
by the system. Thus the system offers a computational account of a limited class of reflexive reasoning.
The proposed system obeys all the constraints applicable t o connectionist models. In particular, the
system uses simple phase-sensitive binary threshold units that exchange simple 1-bit messages and the
system operates without a global clock. The number of nodes required to encode knowledge is only linear
in the size of the knowledge-base and the representation of dynamic bindings does not require the existence
of hard-wired connections between all possible argument-filler pairs.
We have outlined several extensions of the proposed system. These include dealing with several dynamic
instantiations of the same predicate, extracting argument bindings to answer wh-queries, interfacing the
rule-based syskem with an IS-A hierarchy so that individuals as well as abstract concepts may occur within
facts and rules, admitting function-terms in rules and facts, and encoding soft (probabilistic) rules instead
of purely logical rules. In the near future we envision the design of a system that will perform a range of
deductive and abductive inferences -make predictions and generate explanations, and do so with remarkable
efficiency.
We believe that the work described in this paper is a reasonable demonstration of how a system made
of slow and simple computing elements with switching times and periods of oscillations in the rnsec. range,
can encode millions of facts and rules and yet perform systematic inferences involving chains of reasoning in
the hundred msec. range.
The work also demonstrates that mechanisms implicated in the solution of low-level sensorimotor tasks
are perhaps suficient to model high-level cognitive functions such as systematic thought. We consider this
to be of significance to the study of cognition.
It has often been argued that a deep understanding of intelligence will accrue only if we adopt an
integrated approach that synthesizes computational, behavioral, as well as neurobiological issues. We hope
that the work described in this paper is a small step in this direction.

11

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the A1 Group at ICSI, Berkeley

-

in particular, Jerry Feldman, Mark Fanty and Bob

Wilensky; R. Chandrasekar, Pat Hayes, Geoff Hinton, George Gerstein and Simon Thorpe whose comments,
suggestions, and criticisms are greatly appreciated. Also thanks to Denis Dancanet for drawing the numerous
figures that appear in this paper. This research was supported by NSF grants IRI 88-05465, hICS-8219196-

CER, MCS-83-05211, DARPA grants N0001485-K-0018 and N00014-85-I<-0807, and ARO grant ARODAA29-84-9-0027.

End Notes
1. One could argue that some of the steps in the above reasoning process are pre-compiled or 'chunked'.
However, it would be preposterous to claim that the entire chain of reasoning given above can be
construed as retrieval or even a single step inference!
2. A reference to a single node may be replaced by a reference to a small ensemble of nodes (See Section
5.2).
3. CSN performs evidential or probabilistic reasoning and can deal with exceptions and multiple inheritance situations stemming from default attribute values. However, these aspects of the system are not
relevant here.
4. In this example we only consider rules that have a single antecedent and a single consequent. We do

this to kiep our discussion simple and the observations apply to complex rules as well.

5. Fast synapses that can modify their weights in the hundred millisecond range have been proposed by
von der Malsburg (1986).
6. By 'entity' we mean both, individual concepts such as 'John' as well as abstract concepts such as 'Dog'.
With reference to formal logic, entities correspond to terms.
7. In fact these bindings can only be represented temporarily! In view of points 1 and 2 the number of

such inferred facts would be enormous and the system will run out of memory rather soon if it had to
remember all the intermediate results.

8. If one is willing to accept the existence of some independent mechanism for sustaining phase-sensitive
oscillations then it is easy to envision a system in which the firing frequency of a node varies during
each episode of reasoning and is governed by the number of distinct individuals participating in the
bindings. In earlier reports we had described such a realization that used a global clock to provide the
necessary control. (Shastri & Ajjanagadde 1989; Ajjanagadde & Shastri 1989).
9. Thorpe and Imbert (1988) argue that even the number of visually identifiable objects is upwards of a

hundred thousand.
10. Link weights will play a crucial role in a system that encodes evidential rules (see Section 8.4).

11. The assumption that signal propagation delays are zero is realistic in case of electrically coupled neurons
(Llinas et al. 1974). Encoding a rich body of conceptual knowledge, however, would require connecting
spatially distant neurons and it is unlikely that electrical coupling can be effective over the required
distances.
12. A cross-interval histogram of the spike trains produced by two cells, A and B, is obtained as follows
(Gerstein 1970): Time intervals are measured from a given spike of train A to the nearest preceding
and succeeding spikes of train B. This is repeated using each spike of train A as origin, and a histogram
is compiled.

A

B

13. The encoding described in Section 7 naturally detects multiple dynamic instantiations of a predicate
- no

addition machinery is required.

14. Given the rules Vx, y P ( z , x ,y) + R(x, y) and Vx, y R(z, y) a Q(y, x), the system will respond
correctly t o queries such as R(a, b), R(a, y), Q(a, b) and Q(y, a) because the bindings specified in these
query result in the repeated variable (x) of P getting bound. The system may respond incorrectly to
queries such as R(z, b), R(z,y), and Q(a, y) as these leave x unbound.
15. Any reasoning system not subject to this limitation would be capable of handling recursion to arbitrary
depths - something that is known to be computationally intractable.

16. There exists an alternate solution that uses only a single stage. This involves assigning distinct phases
to unbound as well as bound arguments and using two different levels of activation, one for bound
argumen!s/constants and another for unbound arguments.
1

.

17. The use of phase to encode entities when generalized to concepts in an IS-A.hierarchy may shed some
light on the attribute binding problem discussed in (Stenning et al. 1988). Although the argument
binding and the attribute binding problems are related, they differ in significant ways. The attribute
binding problem concerns phenomena that occur over relatively long time intervals and do not involve
any inference: a subject reads a sequence of sentences over several seconds in a self paced mode before
attempting to recall the attribute bindings. The argument binding problem involves propagating
argument bindings very rapidly in order to support inferences that must occur within hundreds of
milliseconds. Attribute bindings, on the other hand, are influenced by - and must interact with existing semantic information in the form of attribute values associated with existing concepts in the
IS-A hierarchy.

18. In (Shastri, 1988a; Shastri,l988b) we describe a connectionist semantic memory that solves an interesting class of inheritance and recognition problems based on an evidential treatment of knowledge.
The system deals with exceptional and conflicting multiple inheritance situations as well as best match
or part-lialmatch situations during recognition.
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Table 2: 'some queries and answers with reference to the rule-base and IS-A hierarchy shown in Fig. 26.

QUERY

yes-no-form
(answer)

wh-form
(answer)

preys-on(Sylvester, Tweety)

Does Sylvester prey on Tweety?

-

scared-of(Tweery,Sylvester)

(yes)
Is Tweet. scared of Sylvester?

-.

scared-of(x.Sylvester)

(yes)
Is someone scared of Sylvester?

Who is scared of Sylvester?

preys-on(Cat, Bird)

(yes)
Do cats prey on birds?

scared-of(Bird,Cat)

(yes)
Are birds scared of cats?
(yes)

(Bird)

t

Fig. 1: Encoding static bindings using dedicated nodes and links. give23 is a
focal node and the triangular nodes are binder nodes.
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Fig. 3: Rythmic pattern of activation representing the dynamic bindings (giver =
John, recipient = M a r y , give-object = B o o k l ) . These bindings constitute the

fact give( J o h n , M a r y , B o o k l ) . All active nodes fire with the same frequency but
occupy distinct phases in the firing pattern. The binding between an argument
and a filler is represented by the in-phase firing of associated nodes.
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Fig. 4: An alternate representation of the bindings (giver = John,recipient =
M a r y , give-object = B o o k l ) . The particular phase occupied by a filler and

argument nodes is not critical.
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Fig. 5: Representation of the dynamic binding (giver = John) that constitutes
the partially instantiated fact 'John gave someone something'.
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Vz, y [ b u y ( x ,y )

* ozon(y, z ) ] ,Vx, y [own(x,y) J can-sell(x,y)], and

+ o w n ( x ,y ) ] .

Links between arguments reflect the correspon-

dence between arguments in the antecedents and consequents of rules.
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Fig. 9: Pattern of activation after one period of oscillation (with reference to
the state of activation in Fig. 8). This state represents the dynamic bindings:
(giver = John. recipient = M a r y , give-objed = Bookl, owner = M a r y , ownobject = B o o k l ) . The system has essentially inferred the fact o w n ( M a r y ,Bookl).
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Fig. 10: Pattern of activation after two periods of oscillation (with reference to
the state of activation in Fig. 8). This state represents the dynamic bindings:
(giver = John, recipient = b l a r y , give-object = B o o k l , owner = M a r y , ownobject = B o o k l , potential-seller = M a r y , can-sell-object = B o o k l ) . T h e system has essentially inferred the facts o w n ( M a r y ,B o o k l ) and can-sell(Mary,B o o k l ) .
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Fig. 11: Encoding of long-term facts. The interconnections shown here encode
the static bindings (giver = John, recipient = Mary,give-object = B o o k l ) that
constitute the long- term fact give( John, M a r y , Bookl). The pentagon shaped
node in a r-and node. Such a node becomes active if it receives uninterrupted
input for the duration of its period of oscillation.
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Fig. 13: Ensemble based encoding of the rules V x ,y ,r [give(x,y, 2)
and Vx, [ o w n ( x ,y )

+

o w n ( y,z ) ]
can-sell(x, y)]. Arguments are encoded as ensembles of

nodes rather than single nodes. A link between argument nodes is replaced by a
bundle of links between appropriate argument ensembles. The dynamic binding
between an argument and its filler is encoded by the in-phase activation of the
appropriate filler and argument ensembles. Propagation of bindings is is realized
via links between appropriate argument ensembles that cause nodes in these
ensembles to fire in synchrony.
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Fig. 15: Activation trace for the query can-sell(Mary,B o o k l ) (Can Mary sell
Bookl?). The query is posed by providing appropriate inputs to e:can-sell, l l f a r y ,

B o o k l , p-seller and cs-obj as shown. The activation of c : can-sell, the collector
of t h e query predicate can-sell, indicates a yes answer.
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Fig. 17: Encoding rules where the same variable occurs in multiple argument po-

sitions in the consequent. The network encodes the rule Vx P ( x ) + VyQ(x, x, y , a).
The rule must fire only if a multiply occuring variable is unbound, or if all occurrences of the variable are bound to the same constant. The node 92 is like a r-or
node except that it becomes active if it receives inputs in more than one phase
within a period of oscillation. On becoming active it activates the node gl which
is a r-or node. The firing of g l blocks the firing of the rule whenever the first and

'

second arguments of Q get bound to different constants. (The above encoding
also enforces the constraint that last argument of Q should not be bound to any
constant other than a.

.

Fig. 1.8: Multiple antecedent rules are encode,d using an additional r-and node
whose threshold equals the number of predicates in the antecedent. This additional node becomes active if and only if it receives inputs from the collector
nodes of all the antecedent predicates. The interconnections between the argument nodes of the antecedent and consequent predicates remain unchanged. The
figure illustrates the encoding of the rule Vx, yP(x,y ) A
r-and node labeled 93 has a threshold of 2.

Q(y,x) + R ( x ,y). The

Fig. 19: Encoding a rule with repeated variables in the antecedent within a forward reasoning system. The figure shows the encoding of the rule Vx, y P ( x ,x,y )

+

R(x,y). This rule should fire only if all the arguments corresponding to the repeated variable ( x ) get bound to the same constant. The node g is a T-or node
with a threshold of 2 and receives inputs from the two argument nodes that
should be bound to the same filler. It becomes active if it receives two inputs
in the same phase and enables the firing of the rule via intermediary p-btu and
T-and nodes that also have a threshold of 2.

LOVE

Fig. 21: The subnetwork encoding the binary predicate love. A single bank of
predicate and argument nodes has been replaced by three banks of nodes. In
general, k banks are required if a predicate needs to be dynamically instantiated
k times.

I

Tom

Mary
John
time
Fig. 23: The output of the love subnetwork when it encodes the facts
l o v e ( J o h n , M a r y ) and l o u e ( M a r y ,T o m ) . This pattern is obtained by gating the

output of the argument nodes with the output of the predicate node in the associated bank. Dynamic bindings associated with the two facts no longer overlap
temporally. The bindings between an argument and its filler are encoded using
temporal synchrony at the time-scale of w (1 msec.). The argument-filler bindings pertaining to the same fact are grouped together using temporal 'synchrony'
at the time scale of a (10 Insec.).
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IS-A HIERARCHY

RULES AND FACTS

(Concept nodes in is-a hierarchy behave
like constant nodes)

Fig. 25: Interaction between a rule-based reasoner and an IS-A hierarchy (conceptual llierarch?;). The rule component encodes the rule Vx,y preys-on(x, y ) +
scared-of ( y , x ) and the fact p r e y s - o n ( C a t , Bird).

'

Fig. 27: Propagating bindings by propagating patterns over argument ensembles.

